Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing Workplace Law by Hirsch, Jeffrey M.
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2010
Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing
Workplace Law
Jeffrey M. Hirsch
University of North Carolina School of Law, jmhirsch@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Alabama Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
File: HIRSCH EIC PUBLISH.doc Created on: 12/6/2010 2:25:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2010 3:28:00 PM 
1025 
REVOLUTION IN PRAGMATIST CLOTHING:  
NATIONALIZING WORKPLACE LAW 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch* 
ABSTRACT 
Workplace governance in the United States consists of a fragmented 
system of rules emanating from federal, state, and local governments. This 
fragmentation creates an unnecessarily inefficient and suboptimal system 
of regulation that often makes workplace protection little more than a false 
promise for workers. Ironically, these problems are at least partially the 
result of too many disparate rules. Thus, a reduction in the number of 
workplace protections could improve the effectiveness of the system as a 
whole. Achieving that goal requires a solution that reflects the magnitude 
of the problem; tinkering at the margins will accomplish little. According-
ly, this Article proposes a revolutionary reform: the nationalization of 
workplace law. The modern, global economy no longer justifies local con-
trol over the workplace, especially given the problems with our current 
federalist model of regulation. Moreover, the federal government’s struc-
tural advantages give it the best opportunity to push workplace law to-
wards a more optimal level. Exclusive federal regulation will also allow 
for significant streamlining and simplification. These changes will increase 
the effectiveness of workplace laws and allow more workers to enjoy the 
protections that these laws promise. 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................... 1025 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1026 
I. REGULATORY PRAGMATISM ............................................... 1029 
II. A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF WORKPLACE LAW ....................... 1032 
A. Optimal Level of Regulation ......................................... 1032 
  
 ∗ Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.  B.A., 1988, University of 
Virginia; M.P.P., 1995, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1998, New York University.  I would like 
to thank Lynn Dancy Hirsch, Matthew Finkin, Timothy Glynn, William Herbert, Anne Marie Lofaso, 
Alex Long, Marcia McCormick, Dan O’Gorman, Paul Secunda, and Mike Zimmer (who also sug-
gested the title) for their helpful comments.  This Article benefited greatly from feedback generated 
during presentations at the University of Tennessee College of Law, the Second Annual Colloquium 
on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, and the Third Annual Seton Hall Labor & 
Employment Law Scholars’ Forum. 
File: HIRSCH EIC PUBLISH.doc Created on:  12/6/2010 2:25:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2010 3:28:00 PM 
1026 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 61:5:1025 
 
B. Suboptimal Workplace Regulation and the Effect on Compliance 
and Enforcement ...................................................... 1034 
1. A Brief History of American Workplace Law ................. 1036 
2. Multiple Claims and Standards ................................. 1038 
3. Multiple Forums ................................................... 1044 
4. Statutory Confusion ............................................... 1047 
5. Adjudication Costs ................................................ 1048 
III. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO REGULATING THE WORKPLACE: 
NATIONALIZING WORKPLACE LAW .................................... 1050 
A. Pragmatism and Optimal Workplace Regulation .................. 1050 
B. Vertical Integration: Nationalizing Workplace Law .............. 1052 
1. A Pragmatic Approach to Federalism .......................... 1052 
2. A National Workplace Law for a National (and International) 
Economy .......................................................... 1055 
3. The Failed Promise of Workplace Federalism ................ 1059 
a. Laboratory Theory ........................................... 1059 
b. Political Catalyst Theory .................................... 1062 
C. The Federal Workplace Code ........................................ 1064 
1. Which Law To Nationalize? ..................................... 1065 
2. Horizontal Integration: Streamlining Workplace Law and its 
Enforcement ...................................................... 1066 
D. Doomed by History?: Past Nationalization Attempts ............. 1068 
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Too Little 
Preemption? ...................................................... 1068 
2. National Labor Relations Act v. the Ratchet Approach ...... 1072 
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................... 1076 
INTRODUCTION 
Problems with our labor and employment (“workplace”) laws have 
prompted an avalanche of reform proposals over the years. The 2008 elec-
tion gave such proposals more prominence, as the political feasibility of 
substantial workplace reform appeared higher than it had in decades. Yet, 
a question remains whether these proposals—even if enacted—are a waste 
of time. Reform proposals typically address a relatively narrow problem 
while ignoring the significant shortcomings of the workplace regulatory 
system as a whole. Without addressing these fundamental problems, even 
the best reforms will have little impact. Thus, this Article argues that our 
primary focus should be to strengthen the workplace regulatory system 
itself, making both existing and new laws more effective. In particular, the 
Article proposes a radical reform aimed at eliminating much of the com-
plexity and inefficiency in our current system—a reform that would natio-
nalize workplace law. 
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Workers in the United States possess a multitude of rights, at least in 
theory. Prohibitions against discrimination and retaliation, protections for 
whistleblowers and collective activity, and guarantees of certain wages or 
safety measures are but a few of the many rights that workers are sup-
posed to enjoy. For many workers, however, these rights are illusory. 
Despite literally hundreds of different workplace protections emanating 
from federal, state, and local governments, their impact on the workplace 
is questionable. The irony is that it may be the sheer number and sources 
of these rights that are undermining workers’ ability to benefit from them. 
Numerous critics have argued that American workplace rules fail to 
achieve many of their goals.1 This failure underscores the suboptimal na-
ture of our workplace regulatory system; that is, a system in which 
changes could be made that would increase social welfare without impos-
ing more costs than benefits.2 One of the hallmark workplace protections—
the prohibition against discrimination based on race, sex, color, national 
origin, and religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII)3—provides an excellent example. Evidence shows that Title VII has 
reduced workplace discrimination far less than intended.4 Although there 
are several reasons for Title VII’s shortcomings, the decentralized and 
fragmented nature of the workplace regulatory system itself is a substantial 
impediment to Title VII’s antidiscrimination goals. 
The workplace regulatory system has developed incrementally, as var-
ious levels of government have enacted new laws with little consideration 
for how they will work in practice. That our federalist regime has created 
a patchwork of overly complicated laws should come as no surprise. What 
is a surprise, however, is that few have questioned whether this state of 
affairs makes sense for workplace regulation. 
The answer, according to this Article, is no—at least not in the current 
economy. Although state governance of the workplace made sense at one 
point in our history, that time has long passed.5 The modern economy is 
global in scale, and our workplace laws should reflect that reality. Instead 
of acting as if workplace regulations affect only isolated, local labor mar-
  
 1. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Em-
ployment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1448–90 
(1996). 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 4. See supra note 1; Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidi-
scrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193 (2009); 
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination 
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003). 
 5. But see William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Track-
ing Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. 
SOC’Y 409, 455–66, 470 (2006) (arguing that states have been more responsive to privacy concerns 
related to new technologies). 
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kets, we should seek a more comprehensive and centralized regulation of 
our national labor market. Indeed, given the severe problems associated 
with our fragmented workplace regulatory system, we should nationalize 
workplace law, making the federal government the exclusive source of 
regulation. The federal government is in a better position than the states to 
promote our competiveness in the global labor market and place our na-
tional interests over parochial ones. In short, rather than continuing to 
view the workplace as it used to exist, we should instead recognize that the 
federal government is the best entity to regulate the workplace as it now 
exists. 
Proponents of federalism argue that it promises superior policymaking 
and protection for individual liberties. Although that promise may be ful-
filled in some areas, it has fallen far short in the workplace. In contrast, 
centralized governance, while not perfect, is in a better position to maxim-
ize social welfare by developing a cohesive body of workplace regulations 
that actually deliver on their promises to workers. 
Centralized control of the workplace is also likely to enhance substan-
tive protections for the average worker. Although workers in a small 
handful of employee-friendly states would see a decrease in the number of 
their workplace rights, all United States workers would achieve gains as 
the remaining protections would become more effective. Additionally, a 
federal government with exclusive authority would likely enact more 
workplace protections than it does today. 
Workplace rights that are part of a centralized structure would also 
avoid many of the complexities that undermine the effectiveness of our 
current system of governance. A nationalized workplace system would be 
easier for parties to understand; would minimize the number of workplace 
rules; would better integrate the rules that did exist; and would decrease 
the number of suits that involve different forums, different substantive and 
procedural standards, and different coverage rules. These improvements 
would make our workplace laws more effective and bring them closer to 
the socially optimal level. 
To be sure, shifting to a centralized regime would be revolutionary 
and not without costs; yet, the potential benefits of such a move make it 
worth exploring. Other countries have nationalized workplace governance6 
and, although such comparisons are not perfect, they suggest that nationa-
lizing United States workplace law may not be as risky as it appears from 
the American perspective. Indeed, countries with nationalized workplace 
  
 6. See, e.g., LILIANE JUNG, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL LABOUR LAW 
PROFILE: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2001), http:// www.ilo.org/ public/ english/ dialogue/ 
ifpdial/  info/ national/ ger.htm (noting Germany, which allows for state workplace regulation, is 
largely nationalized in practice); LILIANE JUNG, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL 
LABOUR LAW PROFILE: JAPAN (2001), http:// www.ilo.org/ public/ english/ dialogue/ ifpdial/info/ 
national/jp.htm. 
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governance—virtually all industrialized nations—have much greater pro-
tections for workers than the United States does.7 That difference cannot 
be explained solely by federalism, but it shows that our system has not 
been a great boon to workers. Thus, suggestions that nationalizing Ameri-
can workplace law would harm workers8 are exaggerated and possibly 
backward. 
Arguments in favor of keeping or expanding the role of the states9 in 
the workplace are especially perplexing given the undeniable problems 
with our current regulatory system. If the argument to nationalize 
workplace law was a radical proposal to improve an already successful 
system, opposition would be understandable. However, resisting change 
because of a reluctance to break away from a failed system is much harder 
to countenance. Nationalizing workplace law could easily fail, but given 
the problems of the current system, is it not worth considering? 
Finally, the radical nature of the proposal to nationalize all workplace 
regulations is intentional. Workplace law has significant problems; thus, 
equally significant reforms are warranted. However, even if one objects to 
nationalization, the hope is that this proposal will at least spur discussion 
about the failures of our current system of workplace regulations and how 
to address them. There should be little dispute that this system could be 
drastically improved by reducing the inconsistencies among federal and 
state regulations, by making rules easier to understand, and by streamlin-
ing enforcement. Other reforms could also be part of the mix, but only if 
they reflect the severity of the problems currently plaguing workplace law. 
Part I of this Article examines the need for a new, more holistic ap-
proach to workplace regulation, described as “regulatory pragmatism.” 
Part II employs this regulatory approach by providing a pragmatic critique 
of existing workplace laws, particularly the excessive level of complexity 
that hinders enforcement of those laws. Finally, Part III proposes a broad, 
pragmatic solution—nationalizing workplace law—that would create a 
more optimal level of regulation by centralizing and simplifying workplace 
governance. 
I. REGULATORY PRAGMATISM 
Policymaking (much like legal scholarship) often focuses on theory far 
more than actual practice. “Regulatory pragmatism” is a system of regula-
tory governance that attempts to reverse that approach by shifting policy-
  
 7. See supra note 6. 
 8. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Workplace Federalism: The Ironic Necessity for State Protection 
of Workers, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 29 (2009). 
 9. Local governments may have their own laws; however, for the sake of simplicity, “state” will 
be used to denote state and local governments unless noted otherwise. 
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makers’ focus to the practical effects of their rules. Although theory is 
important, regulatory pragmatism—taking cues from legal pragmatism’s 
approach to judicial interpretations—promotes the idea that policymakers 
should consider foremost the impact of their decisions.10 This calculus 
depends less on an overarching philosophy of regulation than a reliance on 
disciplines such as economics, sociology, and psychology to better predict 
a rule’s ability to achieve desired results. 
A concern for pragmatism is not new, as the beginnings of the Ameri-
can legal pragmatism movement arose in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century.11 This philosophy pushed for a contextual approach to regulation 
that would develop theories from practical experiences.12 Gone would be 
the days where regulators began with theory in an attempt to address a 
problem; instead, pragmatist policymakers would examine various prob-
lems and attempts to solve them—and only then build a theory.13 Current-
ly, the dominant strain of this philosophy is “legal pragmatism,” which 
centers on judges’ role in interpreting law. Judge Richard Posner is the 
most prominent jurist who adheres to this type of decision making, and his 
opinions often exhibit the practical concerns that legal pragmatism encou-
rages.14  
According to Professor Daniel Farber, legal pragmatism “essentially 
means solving legal problems using every tool that comes to hand, includ-
ing precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy . . . .”15 Pragmatism 
emphasizes context and the development of rules based on experience.16 
Yet, defining legal pragmatism may be best explained by describing what 
it is not. 
Farber depicts legal pragmatism as part of a broader attack against 
constitutional “foundationalism,” which he defines as a search for a unify-
ing principle upon which judicial decisions are based.17 The problems with 
this approach include the creation of theories that are too abstract to decide 
  
 10. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 15–16 (2003); Alexander Tsesis, Toward a Just Immigration Policy: Putting 
Ethics into Immigration Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 105, 139–40 (1999) (arguing for pragmatic immi-
gration legislation that “consider[s] the foreseeable extent to which laws can improve the welfare of 
society”). 
 11. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1337 
(1988). 
 12. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16; JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 
(1971). 
 13. J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmen-
tal Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 532 (2000) (book review).  
 14. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996); see also O.W. 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been expe-
rience.”). 
 15. Farber, supra note 11, at 1332.  
 16. Id. at 1335 & n.23, 1432 (citing Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Fore-
word: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28–29 (1986)). 
 17. Id. at 1334–35 & nn.17–22. 
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particular cases, inconsistent outcomes that occur when judges follow dif-
ferent theories, decisions that fail to gain respect from society, and the 
inability to adjust to changes in society.18 Pragmatism, by contrast, is non-
foundational. It recognizes the difficulties presented in the law and pro-
motes incremental decisions that look to past experience, changes in socie-
ty, and the diversity of views in society.19 An important feature of legal 
pragmatism is its focus on the social impact of a decision.20 Rather than 
holdings based solely on the dictates of a judge’s grand theory, a pragmat-
ic decision would take into account the effects of a case’s potential out-
come. 
The ideas underpinning legal pragmatism extend beyond judicial deci-
sion making, or at least they should. Policymakers also should avoid ad-
hering to a grand theory of regulation without attempting first to ground it 
in reality. This reality checking should be a continuous process. After the 
initial promulgation of a regulation, repeatedly examining its effects would 
provide the best measures of success in most instances. These examina-
tions should be the basis for future regulation, whether through an entirely 
new scheme or an amendment to the incumbent system.21 
Although it seems obvious that an effective regulation must actually 
achieve its goals,22 that aim is often the exception rather than the rule. 
Workplace law is a prime example of this problem. The complex and mul-
tifaceted system of federal and state laws has produced an inconsistent and 
ineffective workplace governance regime. A pragmatic approach to 
workplace law would take into account these enforcement problems and 
seek reforms that would better fulfill the policy goals of the current sys-
tem.23 
  
 18. Id. at 1340–41. 
 19. Id. at 1342–43. Farber describes the basic question of pragmatic judicial decision making as 
whether an idea “works, whether it produces better results for society.” Id. at 1353. 
 20. Id. at 1343. 
 21. Environmental law scholars, in particular, have stressed the need for pragmatic approaches to 
regulation, such as pollution permit trading schemes that promise greater reductions in pollution at a 
lower cost to regulated entities. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Note, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the 
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352 (1999); 
see also Ruhl, supra note 13, at 532 (describing environmental pragmatism as considering economic 
and social change, realities of nature, future consequences of decisions, and need to adapt decision-
making processes).  
 22. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 93 (1960) (stating that industrialized 
economies should constantly attempt to simplify regulation and try to make them more effective). 
 23. David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters, 
28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125 (2007); Michael J. Zimmer, Book Review, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 249, 250, 260 (2000) (reviewing BOB HEPPLE, ET AL., EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK—
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF U.K. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
LEGISLATION (2000) and complementing U.K. study for examining how laws actually work). 
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II. A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF WORKPLACE LAW 
A. Optimal Level of Regulation 
The ultimate goal of workplace governance should be the achievement 
of an optimal level of regulation. Defining “optimal” is easier said than 
done, as determining what goals should be achieved and how to quantify 
them is difficult, if not impossible. However, we can describe certain cha-
racteristics by which current and proposed regulations may be measured. 
An optimal level of regulation can be characterized in economic terms 
as the amount of regulation that maximizes overall societal welfare. This 
maximization point turns on whether the level of regulation is considered 
economically efficient. Under “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency, the economical-
ly efficient level occurs when no change can be made that would provide 
more benefits to society than costs—essentially a utilitarian model.24 Ac-
cordingly, an optimal level of workplace regulation is one in which no 
changes exist that would satisfy this cost-benefit analysis.25 
Regulatory systems can deviate from this efficiency goal in at least 
two ways: either too much regulation or not enough. This concept of “too 
much” or “too little” implicates both the substance and the quantity of 
regulations. For example, a workplace regulatory system will be at a sub-
optimal level if it could enhance social welfare by increasing the number 
of protections for workers or by making existing protections more expan-
sive. These changes would provide benefits to workers and the rest of 
society that exceeded whatever additional costs they placed on businesses 
and the economy. In turn, a system could have protections that are too 
great in number or that impose too many requirements. In this system, the 
benefits to workers are less than the costs of the regulations, suggesting 
that a decrease in protection would move closer to the optimal level of 
workplace regulation. 
Identifying the optimal level of workplace regulation is far more diffi-
cult than describing it. Accurately calculating the costs and benefits of 
workplace laws is not feasible; the benefits, in particular, often involve 
unquantifiable measures of utility to workers and others in society. 
The substantive coverage of workplace laws exemplifies this mea-
surement problem, as the effects of such laws are very difficult to iso-
  
 24. In other words, an alternative is considered more efficient than the status quo if the winners 
under the alternative would be willing to compensate the losers. Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) 
Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2003). Another definition is 
Pareto efficiency, which states that the economically efficient point is where no changes can be made 
without making someone worse off. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Work-
ers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2007). 
 25. An optimal level of regulation can also be defined as the “point at which the marginal cost of 
a unit of regulation equals the marginal benefit for individuals within that jurisdiction.” John O. 
McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 907–08 (2001). 
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late.26 Many have argued both for27 and against28 protections for workers 
and this disagreement could be framed as a search for the optimal level of 
substantive workplace regulation. Although in comparison to other coun-
tries it appears that the United States has too few protections for workers, 
there is no robust empirical support for either position. Yet, this issue 
need not be resolved to see that nationalizing workplace law provides the 
best opportunity to achieve an optimal level of regulation. Success, even if 
measurable, is not guaranteed. However, as described in more detail be-
low,29 the federal government—although far from perfect30—is better 
equipped than the states to take into account the national economy, em-
ployer and employee interests, and overall societal welfare. Moreover, 
exclusive federal control would allow both employer and employee advo-
cates to influence policy debates, thereby increasing the chance of more 
balanced policy outcomes. 
In addition to their substance, the quantity of workplace laws also ap-
pears to be suboptimal. As the subsequent discussion illustrates,31 prob-
lems caused by the surfeit of workplace rules are more readily observed 
than issues with their substance. Our federalist regulatory system consists 
of concurrent, and often duplicative, federal and state laws, enacted with 
little consideration of how they work together. The result is a confusing 
patchwork of rules that make enforcement and compliance difficult—the 
costs appear to be greater than whatever benefits are associated with this 
system. A more optimal approach would be to reduce the number of laws 
and make them part of a more coherent whole. 
Take, for example, discrimination law. If we assume that existing 
substantive antidiscrimination protections are optimal, we should explore 
the best way to enforce those protections. Should we have federal and state 
governments pass their own laws, many of which have somewhat different 
coverage, definitions, remedies, and tribunals? Or should we instead use a 
single, centralized governance system that creates a more holistic set of 
rules and can be adjudicated in a single forum? This Article argues that the 
latter system is far more likely to accomplish its goals than the former.32 
  
 26. The most work in this area has involved whether an at will or just cause default for termina-
tions is more economically efficient. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951 (1984); Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation 
in the United States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644, 645–46 (1991); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad 
Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 
1903 (1996); J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: 
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 842. 
 27. See supra note 1. 
 28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (Harvard University Press 1995) (1992). 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. Weil, supra note 23, at 132–33. 
 31. See infra Part II.B. 
 32. It is true that the number of laws could become suboptimally low. The situation is similar to 
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B. Suboptimal Workplace Regulation and the Effect on Compliance and 
Enforcement 
Although reasonable arguments can be made as to the most appropri-
ate level of protection for workers, there are few defenses for the frag-
mented structure of today’s workplace regulatory system. As early as 
1972, Professor Charles Morris described the system of workplace laws at 
that time as “one of confusion and frustration. It is a picture of inefficient 
administration and inadequate compliance; a jurisdictional nightmare of 
overlapping and conflicting decisions. There exists a tableau of never-
ending campaigns to achieve accommodation among separate tribunals 
with related but different areas of interest.”33 That picture has only grown 
worse in the succeeding years. The number of workplace laws has in-
creased significantly since 1972, and with these new laws have come new 
compliance and enforcement burdens that affect employers, employees, 
and judges. Although it is difficult to quantify these costs,34 workplace 
litigation is replete with examples of complex legal schemes creating inef-
ficiencies and barriers to enforcement. In short, the overabundance of 
workplace laws has created a suboptimal level of regulation. This problem 
is substantial and thereby warrants equally substantial reforms—reforms 
that would bring our workplace regulatory system closer to its optimal 
level by drastically simplifying and streamlining protections for workers. 
Ironically, the problems with our current system may come to the fore 
by examining a group often ignored in debates over workplace reform: 
employers. In the United States, over two hundred different federal laws 
govern employers’ relationship with their workers.35 State workplace laws 
add to those requirements, particularly for employers with workers in mul-
tiple jurisdictions.36 A further layer of complexity results from each state’s 
  
the Laffer Curve, which states that there is an optimal level of taxation and having either too low or 
too high taxes will create a suboptimal amount of revenue. See generally James M. Buchanan & 
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Time, and The Laffer Curve, 90 J. POL. ECON. 816 (1982). Given our cur-
rent plethora of workplace laws, it is unlikely that there is a risk of too few laws in a given area. 
 33. Charles J. Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law—Concerning a 
Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 SW. L.J. 471, 495 
(1972); see also Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1462–63 (1971).  
 34. One compliance study found that companies’ lack of knowledge about toxic chemical reporting 
requirements caused a significant portion of the noncompliance with those requirements—even more 
than the costs of compliance. John Brehm & James T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in Environmental 
Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444, 467 (1996). 
 35. Statutes in addition to those described in this Article include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006) (protecting corporate whistleblowers); Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (2006) (restricting use of polygraphs); Workers’ Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2006) (requiring notice before major layoffs and 
plant closures). 
 36. States often have statutes similar to federal laws, particularly antidiscrimination employment 
laws; despite their similar goals, however, the laws are often quite different. Jarod S. Gonzales, State 
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distinct common-law doctrines governing the employment relationship.37 
The different substantive requirements of these laws create compliance 
burdens because employers must determine which rules apply and how to 
satisfy the ones that do.38 The result is that even well-intentioned employ-
ers have an extremely difficult task in making their workplaces fully com-
pliant.39 
This problem is not merely a concern for employers, however. Em-
ployees and the public must also be wary because compliance difficulties 
directly impact the effectiveness of workplace protections. High com-
pliance costs make employers unable or unwilling to fulfill their legal ob-
ligations,40 meaning that workplace laws will have little value to the em-
ployees they were designed to protect or to the policies they were intended 
to promote. 
Complexity generates additional inefficiencies. For instance, a compli-
cated system of workplace laws puts employees—who are generally igno-
rant of even their most basic rights—at a serious informational disadvan-
tage. The ability of employees to exert or trade their rights efficiently re-
quires accurate information, as well as relatively costless enforcement and 
bargaining mechanisms.41 More important, because most workplace laws 
depend on private rights of action, this informational problem creates sub-
stantial barriers to enforcement.42 In short, as the system of workplace 
  
Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 
59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116–20 (2007); Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: 
Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 
469, 473–77 (2006).  
 37. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (implied contract); 
Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing); Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (public policy tort). 
 38. Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 164, 170 (2007) (stating that “parties increasingly find themselves 
subject to conflicting obligations” under the “possibility of multiple or alternative claims drawn from 
across the boundaries of the conventional work law subjects”); Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshap-
ing of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 194 (2001) (“[C]osts 
incurred by companies . . . to comply with more and more detailed employment regulations are sever-
al times the cost of litigation and insurance when companies are sued.”); Jana E. Cuellar, Comment, 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Handling the Element of Intent in Summary Judgment 
Motions, 38 EMORY L.J. 523, 551 & n.180 (1989) (noting compliance difficulties). 
 39. Cf. David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational 
Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 931 (2001) (“In a recent survey of corpo-
rate environmental managers, nearly half reported that their most time-and energy-consuming duty is 
trying to determine whether their companies are in compliance with the law, with seventy percent 
believing perfect compliance is impossible.”). 
 40. David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of 
Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 62 (2005). 
 41. Krueger, supra note 26, at 645–46. 
 42. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1655, 1673 (1996). Attempts to improve employer self-compliance also require effective channels of 
information. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 378 (2005). 
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rights becomes more cumbersome and difficult to understand, those rights 
become less effective. 
1. A Brief History of American Workplace Law 
The fragmented nature of today’s workplace regulations can be traced 
to the development of workplace governance itself. As the typical 
workplace transformed from a small, familial relationship to a larger, 
more impersonal setting, the laws governing work changed also. The shift 
in the type of work that dominated the economy was accompanied by a 
significant increase in workplace regulations. Yet, because these rules 
were often reactions to newly appreciated problems, they were enacted 
with little thought about how they fit together. 
The modern conception of employment as a contractual relationship is 
a relatively recent idea. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, work was large-
ly performed on a very small scale.43 These small agricultural or commer-
cial entities typically had only a couple of workers and were largely go-
verned as a familial master-servant relationship.44 The duties that both the 
master and servant owed the other were characterized more by public pol-
icy than by contract.45 
This situation changed with the onset of the Industrial Revolution and 
its larger, mechanized workplaces. The familial relationship broke down 
as the number of workers at a given location expanded dramatically.46 
Increased competition meant that employers chafed at their duty to keep 
workers employed for a certain amount of time.47 Employees, in turn, 
reacted to their new, harsher workplaces by using more collective activity 
to seek better working conditions.48 At the same time, American courts 
began embracing the concept of individuals’ freedom of contract, which 
was ultimately embodied in the employment “at will” rule—a doctrine that 
permits either party to end the employment relationship for any or no rea-
son.49 This doctrine spread rapidly from the late 1800s until it was the 
  
 43. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.03, at 9 (2007); 
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993). 
 44. PERRITT, supra note 43, § 1.03, at 9 (citing PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND 
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123–24 (1969)); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824 (1980) [hereinafter 
Note, Protecting At Will Employees]; Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the 
Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 
1513 (1980)). 
 45. PERRITT, supra note 43, § 1.03, at 9–10 
 46. Id. at 11. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 11–12; Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 24–25 (2006) (describing employment law transformation as population became 
more industrial). 
 49. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (Tenn. 1884), overruled on other grounds, 
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default in virtually every state by the 1930s.50 Much of the modern era of 
employment law may be viewed as the development of exceptions to the 
at-will rule, which remains the default in all but one state.51 
The initial growth in these workplace regulations occurred largely 
through federal action and judicial opinions dealing with union activity; 
for the most part, states became involved much later.52 Many of the early 
workplace protections involved federal employees.53 For instance, the 
1883 Pendleton Act tore down the patronage system by, among other 
things, requiring merit-based hiring.54 It was not until 1912, however, that 
the federal workplace abandoned the at-will rule by permitting termina-
tions only for “just cause.”55 These civil service protections were streng-
thened by various measures over the next several decades.56 
The federal government, with some states joining in, also began regu-
lating collective activity—albeit with initial resistance from the courts. In 
the early 1900s, the Supreme Court held that various federal and state 
statutes which prohibited discrimination based on an employee’s union 
status unconstitutionally interfered with employers’ and employees’ right 
to freedom of contract.57 This line of reasoning, however, was not limited 
to cases involving collective activity. Indeed, many of the Court’s repeated 
rejections of New Deal legislation in the 1930s involved workplace regula-
tions, such as those setting work conditions and maximum work hours.58 
During this period, the Court’s holdings left states with a larger role in 
regulating the workplace, which they exercised sparingly.59 Federal 
workplace legislation again became prominent once the Court finally 
changed course, a change that occurred in 1937 through its approval of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),60 which created a broad federal 
governance of collective activity that preempted most state regulation. 
  
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law 
at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 356 (2002). 
 50. Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race 
to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453 (2008); Andrew P. Morriss, Explod-
ing Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. 
REV. 679, 700 (1994).  
 51. Montana has enacted a statute prohibiting most terminations that are not made without “good 
cause.” Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1987). 
 52. TOMLINS, supra note 43, at 372–81 (describing rare early state cases awarding damages for 
workplace injuries). 
 53. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381–86 (1983) (describing early federal employment reforms). 
 54. Pendleton Act, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
 55. Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 Stat. 539, 555 § 6 (1912). 
 56. Bush, 462 U.S. at 385–86; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 44, at 1619–68. 
 57. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled in part by 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
 58. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935). 
 59. For example, fifteen states had created minimum wage protections by 1929. Bok, supra note 
33, at 1422. 
 60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 150–169 (2006); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
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Later, prohibitions against workplace discrimination began to appear. 
With few exceptions,61 the federal government again led the way through 
various laws and executive orders,62 finally culminating in the landmark 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 States did not entirely stand on 
the sidelines, however. Although the federal government implemented the 
initial measures, over half of the states had some form of antidiscrimina-
tion legislation by the time of Title VII’s passage.64 
Finally, in the latter half of the twentieth century, state common law 
began establishing exceptions to the at-will default. Although a few cases 
decades earlier had provided damages for terminations,65 it was not until 
the 1970s that states began establishing recognized causes of action for 
employees who would otherwise be unprotected by the at-will rule. These 
causes of action included the contract-based theories of implied job protec-
tion66 and the duty of good faith and fair dealing.67 To a lesser extent, 
states also allowed tort claims in certain circumstances, particularly under 
a theory that the employer acted contrary to public policy.68 
Although states have helped develop workplace law,69 the federal gov-
ernment has often taken the leading role. The federal government’s early 
initiative on workplace issues is particularly notable given questions sur-
rounding its ability to regulate the workplace now. This history also un-
dermines the argument that state authority over the workplace is necessary 
to allow for experimentation and development of workplace laws.70 In-
deed, as illustrated below, concurrent federal and state governance has led 
to a near dysfunctional enforcement system that leaves workers with more 
empty promises than actual protections. 
2. Multiple Claims and Standards 
One of the principal shortcomings of today’s workplace laws is the 
multifaceted nature of adjudications. The expansion of the number of 
  
(upholding NLRA’s constitutionality). 
 61. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 569 (1924) (prohibiting sex-based pay discrimination for teachers). 
 62. See, e.g., Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 22 (1933); Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 
Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941) (prohibiting discrimination by war contractors); Exec. Order No. 
8587, 5 Fed. Reg. 4445 (Nov. 7, 1940) (prohibiting discrimination in federal civil service). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 64. PERRITT, supra note 43, § 10.05, at 19. 
 65. See supra note 52. 
 66. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
 67. Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). 
 68. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (awarding tort damages to employee fired for serv-
ing on jury duty). But see Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (refusing 
to recognize public policy tort). Some earlier courts treated public policy claims as contract-based. See 
generally Petermann v. Local 396, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
 69. For example, President Roosevelt looked to New York’s workplace regulations when estab-
lishing New Deal policies. See FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW (1946). 
 70. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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claims and substantive standards necessary to resolve a workplace dispute 
has created a similar increase in the cost of compliance and enforcement. 
This represents a suboptimal level of regulation, as there are reforms that 
could achieve the same, or more, protections for workers with far fewer 
compliance and enforcement costs. 
Employers again provide a useful vantage. As the number of laws go-
verning the workplace has increased, the burden on employers has in-
creased as well. Each new law is accompanied by a new set of rules, legal 
standards, and court interpretations. Even when a law is similar to an ex-
isting one, employers—as well as employees—must be mindful of their 
frequently disparate requirements.71 This burden is important, for it direct-
ly affects employers’ ability and willingness to comply with those laws. If 
employers fail to achieve a significant degree of compliance, the purposes 
of those laws are left unfulfilled. Moreover, as Professor Clyde Summers 
once warned, increasing the number of workplace rights tends to “hold out 
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the 
lawyers, and clog the legal machinery.”72 Subsequent years have proven 
him correct. 
The myriad of claims and standards that may apply to a given set of 
facts have a significant impact on the enforcement of workplace rights. An 
isolated workplace dispute can produce numerous different claims, each 
with its own particular set of standards and enforcement schemes. Moreo-
ver, even a single allegation—a discriminatory failure to promote, for in-
stance—often implicates multiple claims and standards because both feder-
al and state law apply.73 
The quantity of workplace rules and the possibility of multiple claims 
are not the only problem. Many workplace laws focus on two fundamen-
tally different approaches—individual versus collective workplace rights.74 
At times, these approaches involve directly conflicting requirements, mak-
ing it more costly for employers to comply with the rules, adjudicators to 
decide cases, and employees to understand the rules.75 
There appears to be little advantage to this cacophony of rules, which 
makes the substantial costs of this system all the more difficult to accept. 
  
 71. Morris, supra note 33, at 491 (“[Federal workplace law is] analogous to the six blind men 
touching and describing an elephant. The subject matter . . . tends to be viewed as fragmented, unre-
lated parts, each bearing a different label . . . .”). 
 72. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. 
REV. 7, 19 (1988). 
 73. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); N.Y. HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993). 
 74. See infra note 93. 
 75. Ann. C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 567, 606 (1994) (discussing conflict between employees’ NLRA right to request repre-
sentation in disciplinary interview and employers’ interest in investigating possible Title VII viola-
tions). 
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Take, for example, one of the more commonly disputed workplace ac-
tions: the termination of an employee. Depending on the facts, the em-
ployee could pursue a wide variety of claims under both federal and state 
law.76 Possible state statutory claims include—but are by no means limited 
to—antidiscrimination laws, whistleblower laws, and the antiretaliation 
provisions of other state workplace laws.77 The number of these statutory 
claims is growing, as state legislatures have become increasingly active in 
expanding their governance of the workplace.78 Moreover, state common 
law provides additional causes of actions, including contractual claims 
such as breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and tort claims for violations of public policy, defamation, 
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.79 Relevant federal 
statutes may include antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA),80 and the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA).81 The employee could also make a retaliation 
claim under those laws and others, such as the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA),82 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),83 Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), and Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA).84 If the employee was terminated for engaging in union or other 
collective activity, the NLRA may also be implicated. Further, if the em-
ployee worked for a public employer, there exists potential constitutional 
claims, including free speech, freedom of religion, due process, equal 
protection, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.85 In 
short, a single workplace action as commonplace as a termination can give 
rise to a wide variety of claims, which are often difficult and costly to 
litigate. 
  
 76. See, e.g., Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (permitting discrimination 
claim based on both age and sex). 
 77. See, e.g., N.Y. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW § 296 (antidiscrimination); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 50-1-304 (whistleblower and retaliation). This increase may be partially in response to a lack of 
federal activity. 
 78. States Enacted More Labor Legislation in 2007, Including Wage, Immigration Laws, 27 Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-11 (Feb. 11, 2008) (noting that 46 states had enacted new workplace statutes 
in 2007); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition 
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381 
(2008) (arguing that states may increasingly attract business by promoting their employment law). 
 79. Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity on At-Will Employment: The Search for a 
Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 141, 149–64 (1998) (describing variety of state approaches to em-
ployment at will). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).  
 81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 82. Id. §§ 2601–2654. 
 83. Id. §§ 201–219. 
 84. Id. §§ 651–678. 
 85. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (free speech); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 
U.S. 709 (1987) (search and seizure); see also Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First 
Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117 (2008). 
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The costs of this complexity extend beyond the litigation context. The 
sheer number of rules that overlap the federal and state systems, as well as 
within each system, creates significant compliance costs.86 Consider an 
employee who is injured at work. Such an employee will likely be entitled 
to benefits under the state workers’ compensation system.87 In addition, 
the employee may also be entitled to leave or accommodations under the 
ADA88 and the FMLA.89 The injury may also involve violations of 
OSHA.90 Each of these statutes, however, has different coverage provi-
sions, so an employer must first determine whether the statutes apply to its 
workforce in general or to the specific employee in question.91 
Once the employer determines that an employee is covered by certain 
laws, the difficulties continue. The employer must then ascertain whether 
the employee is actually entitled to any benefits under those laws, while 
also being careful not to take any actions that appear to retaliate against 
the employee for taking advantage of those benefits.92 Further, if the 
workplace is unionized, accommodation of the employee could conflict 
with seniority provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement, threatening 
future litigation.93  
Adding to the complexity is the possible involvement of different ju-
risdictions with inconsistent laws.94 Indeed, companies employing workers 
in multiple states face particularly significant compliance problems.95 
Holding everything else equal, employers with business in multiple states 
  
 86. See supra note 38; Susan J. McGolrick, Employee Rights: Overlap of ADA, FMLA, Workers’ 
Comp Challenging to Employers, Attorney Says, 151 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2001) 
(“[E]mployers must consider the differences between the statutes and avoid assumptions that com-
pliance with one is compliance with all.”). 
 87. Nikita Williams, Note, HIV as an Occupational Disease: Expanding Traditional Workers’ 
Compensation Coverage, 59 VAND. L. REV. 937, 941 (2006). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2006). 
 89. 29 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006). 
 90. Id. §§ 655, 656. 
 91. See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 92. For example, an employee’s injury may be covered by workers’ compensation and qualify for 
leave under the FMLA, yet not be serious enough to qualify as a disability under the ADA. 
 93. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 
757 (1983); Hodges, supra note 75, at 603–08. 
 94. Cf. Immigration Advocates Urge Enactment of AgJOBS to End Shortage of Farmworkers, 203 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-10 (Oct. 22, 2007) (“Immigration activists decried Congress’ failure to 
legislate immigration reform, noting that local governments are trying to fill the void by enacting ‘a 
patchwork’ of ‘inconsistent’ ordinances that are ‘disruptive’ to local labor markets, particularly in 
agriculture . . . .”). 
 95. According to the Census Bureau, in 2002, 0.88% of all firms with paid employees operated in 
more than one state and approximately 1.5% operated in more than one metropolitan area. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, COMPANY SUMMARY: 2002, 1366, 1368, Appendix A-1 (2006), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/sb0200cscosumt.pdf. However, approximately 17% of all estab-
lishments are owned by firms that operate in multiple states (20% in more than one metropolitan area), 
and approximately 45% of all U.S. employees work for firms operating in more than one state (50% 
for firms in more than one metropolitan area). Id. Thus, although the number of multistate firms is 
small, the problems they face have a disproportionate impact on the workplace because they employ 
almost half of all U.S. workers. 
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would prefer uniform regulations to control their costs of compliance.96 
Yet under today’s workplace regulatory system, such employers are re-
quired to comply with not only federal requirements, but also the different 
rules associated with every state in which they have employees.97 
Finally, workplace claims often implicate unique enforcement schemes 
that require administrative, judicial, or arbitral procedures—or a mixture 
of all three. Thus, the employer must be knowledgeable about the re-
quirements and precedent of several different forums, even for a case in-
volving a single set of facts.98 
Differing claims and standards affect employees as well. Most ob-
viously, if employers find it difficult to navigate the maze of workplace 
rules, relatively unsophisticated and uninformed employees will find it far 
more arduous. This creates an information asymmetry that makes en-
forcement extremely difficult and undermines the economic efficiency of 
the regulatory system itself. 99 The difficulty in understanding the complex 
system of workplace laws has a further impact. Like employees, jurors 
and, at times, judges often balk at the level of complexity presented in 
workplace cases, making attempts to enforce workplace rules much hard-
er. For example, one study found that employment discrimination cases 
involving multiple claims have a significantly lower rate of success.100 
Part of the reason for this finding may be the type of judicial hostility 
exhibited in Harrington v. Claiborne County Board of Education.101 The 
district court in Harrington had taken seriously the Eleventh Circuit’s ear-
lier statement that it “deplored muddled complaints in employment dis-
crimination and civil rights cases and urged district courts to ‘take a firm 
hand’ in ensuring efficient and clear proceedings on claims deserving tri-
al.”102 Among other things, the district court’s Harrington decision—with 
  
 96. Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized 
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1356 (2009). 
 97. Lawrence Allen Vranka, Jr., Note, Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of State 
Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 607, 626 (1989); cf. Peter M. Panken & Stacey M. Babson-Smith, Creating the Per-
sonnel Paper Trail: Personnel Manuals and Grievance Procedures, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR 
RELATIONS LAW FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSEL AND THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 259 (ALI-ABA 
Feb. 15–17, 2007), available at SM031 ALI-ABA 249 (Westlaw) (discussing difficulties faced by 
multistate employers in writing employment manuals). 
 98. See infra Part II.B.2; Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for 
Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 608 (2005). 
 99. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 97 
(2008). 
100. Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1439, 1456–59 (2009) (finding that employers won summary judgment in 96% of employment 
discrimination cases involving multiple claims, in contrast to other studies showing employers’ general 
employment discrimination summary judgment rates to be approximately 70–75%, and suggesting 
reliance on multiple claims is viewed as a sign that those claims are weak). 
101. 251 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 2001), cited in Kotkin, supra note 100, at 1461–62. 
102. Id. at 938. 
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the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent approval—required plaintiffs alleging 
multiple claims of employment discrimination to either accept a bifurcated 
trial addressing each ground separately or to argue an “intersectional” 
claim of discrimination that identifies a subclass of discrimination, such as 
a Muslim woman or a Catholic man.103 The Eleventh Circuit’s explicit 
complaint about complex employment discrimination claims, in addition to 
special rules limiting employees’ ability to choose how they pursue their 
claims, exhibits a level of judicial hostility that must be taken into account 
in any reform efforts. 
Recent employment discrimination data reveal the extent of this com-
plexity problem. Even within a specific area of workplace law, the number 
of cases involving multiple theories has increased over the last fifteen 
years. One study has shown that the number of discrimination claims con-
tained in each charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) has grown from 1.13 claims per charge in 1993 to 1.23 
claims per charge in 2006.104 Although these numbers indicate that a large 
number of cases involve no more than a couple of different claims, over 
half of all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC still involve mul-
tiple claims—each of which raises the potential for varying requirements 
or standards.105 Studies of cases that are actually litigated in federal court 
find evidence of even more complexity.106 
No legal regime can completely eliminate judicial resistance to claims 
that allege, often accurately, that an adverse employment decision was the 
result of several unlawful factors. However, a new approach to workplace 
regulation could significantly reduce this hostility by simplifying and 
streamlining workplace claims. For example, by applying a single reason-
able business justification rule to all terminations or by using a single legal 
framework for all claims within a single case, the overall complexity of 
workplace cases would decrease.107 This decrease would likely prompt a 
similar reduction in the judicial hostility to workplace claims in general. 
The result would be a higher success rate for workplace claims, as merito-
rious cases are less likely to be swept away in attempts to relieve over-
loaded dockets. 
  
103. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that an employer could choose 
the order in which the plaintiff had to present each individual claim to the jury and its holding that an 
employer would be entitled to attorney’s fees if it won even one of the separate issues. Id.  
104. Kotkin, supra note 100, at 1451–52. All Title VII claims must be filed with the EEOC as a 
“charge” before being filed in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
105. Id. at 22. 
106. Id. at 18 (citing Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment 
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 46 (2005) (finding that 58% of sampled 
cases involved multiple claims)). 
107. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 93. 
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It is no surprise that today’s workplace laws are often ineffective in 
accomplishing their goals.108 The costs of complying with the varying rules 
are significant. Moreover, employers must account for the possibility that 
its competitors may simply choose to ignore some requirements—often a 
feasible option given the hurdles that employees face in enforcing the 
laws.109 The result is that the policies of today’s workplace laws are un-
dermined by their sheer number and complexity. This problem has created 
a suboptimal level of regulation that should be remedied by decreasing the 
number of workplace laws and simplifying the ones that remain. 
3. Multiple Forums 
The existence of multiple rules governing the workplace creates dupli-
cation and confusion not only in the standards that employers must follow, 
but also in the manner in which claims are adjudicated. In particular, the 
forums in which a worker must enforce various claims are often different 
and may include a federal court, a state court, a federal administrative 
agency, a state administrative agency, or an arbitrator.110 This fragmented 
adjudicatory system is burdensome for employers, which must become 
familiar with the wide array of possible forums. Even worse is the real 
possibility that an employee will be required to pursue claims involving 
the same set of facts in different forums.111 This duplication is characteris-
tic of a suboptimal enforcement system, as it wastes adjudicatory re-
sources, imposes extra costs on employers and employees, and delays res-
olution of workplace disputes. 
The Supreme Court case of University of Tennessee v. Elliot provides 
a good example of the problems caused by multiple forums.112 The plain-
tiff in Elliot was a black employee who alleged that the university’s pro-
posal to terminate him was based on racial discrimination.113 The em-
ployee requested a state administrative hearing on the proposed action and, 
before the hearing started, he also filed a lawsuit in federal district court 
claiming violations of Title VII; Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 
1988;114 and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.115 The em-
  
108. Befort, supra note 49, at 397 (“[L]egal rules governing the employment relationship consist of 
a crazy quilt of regulation emanating from a variety of sources—federal and state, legislative and 
judicial. These regulations . . . bear little relationship to one another beyond having applicability in the 
workplace setting.”). 
109. Hodges, supra note 98, at 614. 
110. Befort, supra note 49, at 398; see also Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 586 n.1 (Ariz. 
1987) (discussing plaintiff who pursued both state and federal lawsuits for same factual dispute). 
111. PERRITT, supra note 43, § 11.03, at 15 (citing cases); Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geo-
metrically: Rethinking Parallel State and Federal Employment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 499, 502–04 (1997) (same). 
112. 478 U.S. 788 (1986). 
113. Id. at 790. 
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988. 
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ployee lost in the administrative proceeding, but rather than appealing, 
simply continued to pursue his federal lawsuit.116 The district court granted 
summary judgment for the university, holding that the administrative deci-
sion should have preclusive effect against the lawsuit; however, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed.117 The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that 
the unreviewed administrative decision could not have preclusive effect 
over the employee’s Title VII claims,118 but held that the decision could 
preclude the employee’s other civil rights claims.119 
The problem is not with the Court’s holding, which was a reasonable 
interpretation of the relevant provisions. Rather, the issue is that these 
related laws had such differing standards—standards that, by their nature, 
are often dispositive to a case. The time and resources used in the adminis-
trative proceeding eliminated one set of claims in the lawsuit, but the judi-
cial litigation continued as if the state agency and its decision never ex-
isted. This makes no sense, particularly because there seems to be no poli-
cy justification for precluding some of these claims, but not others. There 
was one central dispute in Elliot: did the university seek to terminate the 
employee because of performance problems or because of racial animus? 
Parties should be able to—indeed, should have to—resolve such issues in a 
single forum.120 
The Elliot case highlights the possibility that multiple forums are not 
only inefficient, but may also result in conflicting results. A case in which 
that possibility became a reality is W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 
International Union of the United Rubber Workers.121 The Supreme Court 
in W.R. Grace held that a court could not overrule an arbitrator’s award of 
backpay for a termination that violated a collective-bargaining agreement, 
even though the termination was made pursuant to a conciliation agree-
ment with the EEOC.122 In other words, the employer had settled a Title 
VII claim with the agency entrusted to enforce that act, but the employer 
  
115. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 791. 
116. Id. at 792. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 795 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b)(5) (requiring EEOC to give “substantial weight”—not 
preclusive effect—“to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings com-
menced under State or local . . . law”)). 
119. Id. at 797. 
120. Another example is Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971), 
in which the employee first had his termination litigated as an unfair labor practice charge under the 
NLRA, which the NLRB rejected. Id. at 127. Based on the exact same set of facts, the employee then 
pursued a Title VII claim with the EEOC and then in federal court. Id. The Second Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the district court’s refusal to give the NLRB decision preclusive effect against the lawsuit, 
noting that adjudications had significant differences—primarily that the NLRB looked only to whether 
the NLRA, not Title VII, was violated. Id. at 128–29. 
121. 461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
122. The EEOC agreement required the company to maintain the existing proportion of women 
during layoffs, which contradicted the collective-bargaining agreement’s seniority provision. Id. at 
760. 
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still faced liability because that settlement violated its contract with a un-
ion. To be sure, this situation was in part the employer’s own doing.123 
Yet, the fact remains that multiple forums and conflicting statutory poli-
cies made this case far more complex than necessary. 
As W.R. Grace illustrates, the presence of a union further complicates 
workplace cases. For example, if an employee alleges that she was termi-
nated because of her union activity and race, the number of forums rapidly 
multiplies.124 The employee or, in rare occasions, the EEOC must pursue 
the race claim under Title VII in state or federal court. The union claim is 
possibly governed under two different regimes. It will, at a minimum, fall 
under the NLRA’s administrative process. The NLRB’s General Counsel 
has sole authority to seek enforcement of the NLRA and all such cases are 
initially adjudicated before the same agency.125 Moreover, if there is a 
collective-bargaining agreement, the union or employee would likely al-
lege that the termination violated that agreement. Attempts to enforce a 
collective-bargaining agreement requires one of two additional forums—an 
arbitration claim or a federal district court suit under Section 301 of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act.126 Thus, this single termination could 
lead to litigation in one or more of five distinct forums. 
One could argue that different forums make sense if the various adju-
dicators have special expertise in their respective jurisdictions. This argu-
ment is often used to justify administrative litigation, such as the NLRB’s 
adjudication of NLRA claims.127 Even taking that argument as true—and 
the NLRB’s history raises substantial doubt about whether its specializa-
tion provides benefits that outweigh its costs128—the marginal benefit of a 
specialized adjudicator is overwhelmed by the aggregate costs of multiple 
forums.129 Workplace disputes do not always develop neatly under one set 
of specialized rules or another. The employment relationship is compli-
cated; thus, workplace disputes are often impossible to classify as a single 
type of claim. Moreover, many currently existing forums do not involve 
  
123. Id. at 767 (“The [employer] committed itself voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obliga-
tions. When the Union attempted to enforce its contractual rights, the [employer] sought a judicial 
declaration of its respective obligations under the contracts. During the course of this litigation, before 
the legal rights were finally determined, the [employer] again laid off employees and dishonored its 
contract with the Union. For these acts, the [employer] incurred liability for breach of contract.”). 
124. Morris, supra note 33, at 484–85. 
125. NLRA cases are first adjudicated by an administrative law judge (ALJ); a challenge to an 
ALJ’s determination goes before a panel of NLRB members and subsequent appeals go to a federal 
appellate court and, possibly, the United States Supreme Court. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159–160 (2006). 
126. Id. § 185. 
127. Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation To Address Workplace 
Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 232 (2008). 
128. See infra note 267. 
129. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Unsafe Workplaces, Injured Employees, and the Bizarre Bifur-
cation of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 111 W.VA. L. REV. 395 (2009) (discussing 
problems with NLRB’s failure to regulate claims by employees injured at work or victims of sexual 
harassment). 
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any specialization.130 Instead, the numerous sources of workplace laws are 
often the sole reason that a dispute may require multiple forums. The 
complexity and waste of resources that this fragmented enforcement sys-
tem entails demands a more simplified scheme.  
4. Statutory Confusion 
The costs associated with the multitude of workplace laws is com-
pounded by the confusion present in each one individually. Any given law 
has its own peculiar ambiguities and complexities.131 No matter how 
pragmatic the policymaking, issues such as pleading requirements, bur-
dens of proof, summary judgment standards, affirmative defenses, and 
remedies make litigation far from simple. Multiplying those challenges by 
the number of federal and state laws that currently exist creates a system 
that is not only complicated, but also prevents many employers and em-
ployees from being aware of those laws’ basic rights and requirements.132 
Given the difficulties inherent in any one law, the few benefits that may be 
associated with this degree of statutory specialization are outweighed by 
the costs required to enforce these laws, particularly when several differ-
ent laws are implicated by a single workplace dispute. This suboptimal 
structure can be improved by simplifying the standards of each law and, 
where appropriate, using the same standards for multiple laws. 
Unnecessarily confusing standards undermine parties’ ability to under-
stand, comply with, and enforce workplace rules, thereby rendering them 
far less effective than they were intended.133 This confusion hurts most the 
individuals those rules were designed to protect—employees. In addition to 
problems with employer compliance and judicial enforcement, employees’ 
inability to understand their rights severely undermines the efficacy of 
workplace laws. An empirical study by Professor Pauline Kim on em-
ployees’ knowledge of their legal protections reveals the significance of 
  
130. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
131. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy: 
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49 
EMORY L.J. 623, 644 n.129 (2000) (describing difficulties facing Vidalia onion growers in under-
standing and complying with federal employment and immigrations laws) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. 
OFFICE, Pub. No. GAO/HEHS-98-236R, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER PROGRAM: 
EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUAL VIDALIA ONION GROWERS 15 (1998), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/ 161115.pdf). 
132. For example, one employer has stated that “[i]t is difficult enough these days to comply with 
the wealth of laws affecting business when you know what they require. It is almost impossible to do 
so when you do not know and cannot find out what they ultimately require.” Dana M. Muir, From 
Yuppies to Guppies: Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan Regulation, 34 GA. L. REV. 195, 240 
(1999) (quoting Kastler on Delegation of Authority to IRS, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA), Nov. 
26, 1984). 
133. Cf. Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax 
Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013 (2003) (arguing that simplifying tax code would increase 
compliance). 
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this problem.134 According to Kim’s study, approximately eighty percent 
of employees incorrectly believed that their employers could not legally 
terminate one employee to hire another at a lower wage, and nearly ninety 
percent had the mistaken belief that they could not be fired because their 
employers wrongly thought they had engaged in misconduct or because 
their employers personally disliked them.135 Because most workplace laws 
depend to a large degree on employees’ initiating and often pursuing en-
forcement on their own,136 this information gap is critical. An employee 
who is unaware that her rights have been violated will obviously be unable 
to exercise those rights. 
Employees’ lack of knowledge also has a negative effect on employ-
ment generally. This information asymmetry creates a market failure that 
results in an economically inefficient surplus of labor and corresponding 
decrease in wages and benefits. Employees’ erroneously expansive view of 
their workplace rights means that they are more willing to work than they 
would be if they knew the true nature of their rights.137 The result is an 
excessive supply of labor, which lowers employees’ compensation. Simi-
larly, if employees incorrectly believe that they have certain rights, em-
ployers have little incentive to compete with each other to attract workers 
by actually providing those rights. 
The complexity within each individual law compounds the enforce-
ment problems of the workplace governance system as a whole. A law 
will fail to achieve its policy goals if employers, employees, and judges 
find it difficult to understand the law’s requirements. This issue is ripe for 
reform, as clarifying these laws would achieve significant gains while in-
curring few costs—thereby increasing the optimality of the entire 
workplace regulatory system. 
5. Adjudication Costs 
As noted, the patchwork of federal and state workplace laws and their 
various enforcement schemes have created a system in which a single set 
of facts often leads to multiple claims brought in multiple forums.138 This 
  
134. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of 
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997); see also Mark V. Roehling, 
The “Good Cause Norm” in Employment Relations: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 14 
EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 91 (2002) (describing numerous studies showing employees’ erroneous view of 
their discharge rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 
214–15 (2001). 
135. Kim, supra note 134, at 133–34. 
136. Brake & Grossman, supra note 1, at 862 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 415 (1975); Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Title VII 
combats unlawful employment practices . . . principally through reliance on employee initiative.”)). 
137. Hirsch, supra note 99. 
138. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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suboptimal complexity is costly and makes enforcement of those laws far 
more difficult than necessary.139 The result is that employees must con-
front an unenviable and expensive decision of which claims to pursue and 
in which forum.140 Employers, in turn, are unable to anticipate where their 
workplace decisions may end up being challenged.141 Adjudicating these 
complicated claims also imposes significant costs on judicial and adminis-
trative systems.142 
In addition to these costs, the mere perception that litigation is expen-
sive interferes with the enforcement of workplace claims. Employers 
perceive the costs of workplace litigation to be much higher than they ac-
tually are, which artificially lowers demand for labor.143 A major factor in 
this problem is employers’ inability to properly account for the risk of 
monetary judgments; a simpler enforcement system would enable employ-
ers to better understand the true costs of workplace litigation and bring 
their demand for labor closer to the economically efficient level.144 This 
increase in labor demand would lead to higher rates of employment and 
compensation. 
These extraneous adjudication costs could be viewed as reasonable if 
they were accompanied by equivalent benefits. However, that does not 
appear to be the case. Even ignoring the costs associated with parties’ ina-
bility to judge the expense of workplace litigation, our current system of 
workplace governance creates an adjudicatory system that is far more cost-
ly than necessary. Although there may be some isolated exceptions, 145 the 
multiple claims and forums required for workplace cases have little to no 
benefit. Moreover, for low-wage employees, virtually all litigation is 
beyond their reach, thereby making most workplace protections illusory. 
Thus, reform attempts should attempt to streamline adjudication and pro-
vide less expensive forums for certain cases.146 The benefits of such 
changes would likely overwhelm any accompanying costs. 
  
139. See Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 170 (2007). 
140. See PERRITT, supra note 43, § 1.8, at 17. 
141. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) (discuss-
ing termination case in which employee pursued state public policy tort claims following rejection of 
federal claims under Mine Safety and Health Act and NLRA, and attempt to arbitrate claim under 
collective–bargaining agreement), overruled on other grounds by Brentwood v. Boeing Co., 1999 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 506, (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1999); Krueger, supra note 41, at 646 (noting problems with 
current common law system’s ex ante uncertainty). 
142. See Kotkin, supra note 100, at 1459–63. 
143. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAOLY, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, LABOR MARKET 
RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER LIABILITY 51–52, 62 (1992). 
144. Employers include potential litigation costs as part of the marginal cost of using another unit 
of labor. Thus, if litigation costs are perceived to be higher, labor costs will also be viewed as higher 
and labor demand will decrease below the economically efficient level—that is, the level that would 
exist if employers had an accurate view of litigation costs. 
145. See infra notes 267–268 and accompanying text. 
146. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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III. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO REGULATING THE WORKPLACE: 
NATIONALIZING WORKPLACE LAW 
A. Pragmatism and Optimal Workplace Regulation 
The policymakers who implemented our current patchwork of 
workplace laws largely ignored the compliance and enforcement costs of 
this system, emphasizing the theoretical benefits of regulations rather than 
their actual impact.147 What is needed is a deemphasis of this theoretical 
approach in favor of a pragmatic one—an approach that would focus pri-
marily on the ability of workplace laws to achieve their goals. Regulations 
would be based not on their theoretical promise, but rather on their likely 
outcomes and interactions with the entire workplace regulatory system. 
The advantages of regulatory pragmatism do not depend on the exis-
tence of certain workplace rights. Instead of contemplating what rights 
should exist, this policy-making theory asks first how society should at-
tempt to achieve an already-determined set of rights. This is not to say that 
identifying and advocating certain protections is not a worthy endeavor, as 
there are a multitude of valuable proposals to expand workers’ rights.148 
Yet, regulatory pragmatism intends to fill the gap that results when de-
bates over the social value or cost of various workplace rules ignore their 
practical effects. This gap has left many of the social policies at the heart 
of today’s workplace laws unfulfilled—a serious shortcoming that regula-
tory pragmatism could help rectify. 
A pragmatic reform of workplace regulation could take as many forms 
as there are laws. Yet, because problems with the current system are 
widespread, an expansive approach is warranted. In particular, this Article 
proposes to fix the broken workplace governance system through a dra-
matic centralization and compression of workplace laws. This reform 
would nationalize workplace law by replacing state authority over most 
workplaces with exclusive federal regulation. The new national workplace 
regime would further improve the suboptimal nature of today’s fragmented 
enforcement system through an aggressive streamlining of workplace 
laws; creation of a new, specialized workplace court; and centralization of 
administrative authority within a single agency. These changes would de-
  
147. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65 (2007) (showing that whistle-blower statute 
failed to fulfill expectations). 
148. One of the most far-reaching and heralded of these proposals—albeit one that was not 
adopted—was the final report of the Commission on the Future of Worker–Management Relations. 
U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE DUNLAP COMMISSION 
ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MANAGEMENT RELATIONS – FINAL REPORT (1994), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/2/. 
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crease the costs of compliance,149 lower the barriers to enforcement, and 
improve the effectiveness of dispute adjudication.150 
For example, as described in more detail elsewhere,151 an exclusive 
federal workplace regime could replace the myriad rules governing the 
end of the employment relationship with a single reasonable business justi-
fication requirement for all terminations. This universal termination rule 
would likely achieve greater social benefits than the laws it would sup-
plant. Employment discrimination under Title VII provides a perfect illu-
stration. Although perhaps counterintuitive, the termination rule’s reason-
able business justification requirement would achieve greater reductions in 
employment discrimination by eliminating the backlash that has created 
hostility and resistance to Title VII discrimination claims. The termination 
rule’s simplification of employers’ duties and employees’ enforcement 
burdens would further reduce discrimination. In short, by implementing a 
simple, universal standard that would apply equally to all employees, the 
new termination rule could reduce employment discrimination more than 
the numerous federal and state termination laws that currently exist. 
To be sure, the proposal to nationalize workplace law is even more 
ambitious than the universal termination rule and unlikely to be fully 
enacted, at least in the near future. That infeasibility is not a fatal short-
coming, however. To the contrary, an aggressive examination of 
workplace laws may spur new insights into problems that more narrow 
reforms overlook.152 The general pragmatic recommendations of the pro-
posal are important in their own right. Even if we do not fully remove 
state authority over the workplace or consolidate all federal laws, any re-
duction in the number of claims resulting from a single dispute would be 
beneficial. Similarly, where multiple laws are implicated, reducing unne-
cessary differences and the need to litigate in multiple forums would also 
provide greater clarity for parties and enhanced enforcement for the laws 
themselves. The hope is that, if nothing else, the general principles under-
lying the proposal to nationalize workplace law will prompt regulatory 
reform that makes our current system more effective. 
  
149. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (emphasizing that Congress in-
tended Title VII to be enforced primarily through cooperation and voluntary compliance). 
150. Morris, supra note 33, at 475. 
151. Hirsch, supra note 99. 
152. This examination could occur via an expert panel, similar to the Dunlop Commission. See 
supra note 148; see also Andrew B. Coan, Minimalism in Legal Scholarship: A Response to If People 
Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 103 (Stanford Law, Working Paper No. 
1005430, 2007) (arguing that “examining deep questions in a fresh context can cast them in a reveal-
ing new light” and criticizing “minimalist scholarship” which, by “refusing to confront deep theoreti-
cal questions[,] can seriously limit the interest of the remaining avenues for discussion . . . . [and] can 
make superficial explanations appear more compelling than they really are while obscuring important 
deep theoretical alternatives”). 
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A pragmatic nationalization of workplace law would require two ma-
jor transformations: “vertical integration” and “horizontal integration.” 
Vertical integration would take away regulatory power from state govern-
ments and centralize it at the federal level. Horizontal integration would 
assimilate various rules at a single governmental level, such as merging all 
federal workplace rules into a unitary “federal workplace code.” Either 
vertical or horizontal integration individually would move our workplace 
regulatory system closer to the optimal level; yet vertical integration is the 
important—and more radical—first step. Only after workplace law is na-
tionalized can we realize the full benefits of horizontal integration, for it is 
much easier to streamline and condense legal schemes within a single ju-
risdiction. Consequently, this Article’s primary focus will be the benefits 
and process of vertical integration. 
B. Vertical Integration: Nationalizing Workplace Law 
1. A Pragmatic Approach to Federalism 
Federalism, perhaps more than any other political theory, exemplifies 
the need for regulatory pragmatism. Since the early days of the United 
States, proponents of federalism often cited the theory as an overriding 
policy concern that should govern outcomes at the expense of other con-
siderations.153 This purported affinity for federalism154 is the antithesis of 
regulatory pragmatism; the theory of state policymaking has become the 
controlling idea, no matter its efficacy in a particular instance. The failure 
to consider the practical effects of federalism in different areas is disturb-
ing, for the decision between federal or state regulatory authority is likely 
to have profound implications. 
  
153. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2548 & n.18 (2005) 
(citing and criticizing examples). One exception is Frank Cross’s evaluation of federalism’s and decen-
tralization’s impact on corruption and quality of government services. See Frank B. Cross, The Folly 
of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002) (concluding that federalism is associated with more 
corruption and poorer quality services, while decentralization, which is independent of federalism, is 
associated with the opposite). 
154. The same criticism could be leveled against opponents of federalism as they also seem more 
concerned with achieving specific outcomes than a general concern whether control resides in state or 
federal government. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 
(1999) (“[F]ederalism is consistently (and I contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool 
to achieve some other ideological end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself.”); Renee M. 
Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 879, 897 (2006) (arguing that “many appeals to federalism are merely rhetorical 
tactics within a broader political strategy”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some 
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 931 (1994); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, In-
strumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 911 n.26 (2006) 
(“[W]e should bring a healthy skepticism to claims about federalism given that political actors fre-
quently deploy arguments about federalism as a means of advancing their substantive policy agen-
das.”).  
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A pragmatic regulatory approach to this decision should examine the 
advantages and disadvantages of a fragmented versus centralized system of 
regulation.155 This approach has been entirely absent from the current sys-
tem of workplace laws, which are the product of haphazard regulations by 
various jurisdictions.156 The result is an overly complex enforcement 
scheme that has repeatedly prevented workplace laws from achieving their 
goals.157 This is no surprise, because a robust state governance regime 
almost by definition increases the complexity and inconsistencies in the 
law, particularly where non-preemptive federal standards also exist.158 
Providing the federal government with exclusive authority would eliminate 
much of this harmful complexity.159 The question, therefore, is whether 
these costs of workplace federalism are outweighed by its benefits. 
Proponents of federalism make several different claims about the 
theory’s benefits. These purported advantages include the assertions that 
federalism leads to better policy by allowing experimentation at the state 
level,160 better reflects differences across communities,161 makes abuse less 
likely by diluting power,162 and draws more people into the political 
process.163 The Supreme Court has at times also defended federalism as a 
  
155. Ann Althouse has made a similar argument, albeit in a different context, suggesting that dif-
fering views of federalism on the Supreme Court “may find common ground by analyzing the relative 
capacities of the different governmental institutions involved in federalism issues.” Ann Althouse, 
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 1021 
(1993); see also Super, supra note 153, at 2549 (arguing that policymakers and scholars should look 
more closely at how fiscal federalism works). 
156. See supra Part II.B.1. 
157. See supra Part II.A; Hodges, supra note 98, at 602 (emphasizing the “difficulties inherent in 
patchwork regulation by state and federal statutory and common law”). 
158. See, e.g., Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Genetic Testing and Discrimination: How Private is 
Your Information, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 79 (2006) (arguing for a federal genetic antidiscri-
mination bill and noting that “over thirty states have passed laws dealing with some aspect of genetic 
discrimination, but they are a patchwork of different definitions, standards, and remedies”).  
159. Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is Federal 
Reform The Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (1999) (arguing that exclusive federal workers’ 
compensation scheme would be superior to current state regulation); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States 
Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 225 (2008), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-
yale-law-journal-pocket-part/legislation/taking-states-out-of-the-workplace/. 
160. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932); see Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a 
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 521–23 (1976). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy 
and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 
1591–97 (1994) (arguing that state experimentation will not usually occur).  
161. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (holding that federalism “will be more sensitive to the diverse needs 
of a heterogen[e]ous society”). 
162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Althouse, supra note 155, at 988 (noting Su-
preme Court’s defense of federalism as means to enhance democratic self-governance by diffusing 
power). 
163. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE 75 (1991); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for 
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1988) (summarizing arguments). Another potential 
advantage of federalism could be states’ role as a catalyst for federal action on more controversial 
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means to ensure that individual rights are protected against an overcentra-
lization of power.164 Yet this defense of federalism, like the others, does 
not acknowledge that there are times when the theory fails—sometimes 
miserably.165 Instead, the Court frequently endorses federalism based more 
on theory than its actual effects. 
For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,166 the Court ruled against state 
judges who challenged a state constitution’s mandatory retirement rule as a 
violation of the ADEA. The Court stated that federalism’s principal bene-
fit is its ability to guarantee individual liberty.167 However, as Professor 
Ann Althouse has noted, “[r]ather than siding with individual rights on a 
case-by-case basis, the Gregory Court adopted a long-range strategy. The 
Gregory Court chose to invigorate the states in a grand balance of power, 
trusting that over time benefits would flow to individuals.”168 
This approach to federalism is misguided. Educated guesses about the 
result of a particular theory is a necessary aspect of decision making, but 
the Court’s blind reliance on the belief that federalism will enhance indi-
vidual rights was specious. At the same time that it was denying the Gre-
gory plaintiffs’ individual liberty claims, the Court made little provision 
for the possibility that federalism might fail to promote individual liberties 
in all instances.169 The Court stated that it was not following federalism for 
federalism’s sake; however, those words mean little if it refuses to consid-
er whether state autonomy over a given area is likely to result in promised 
benefits.170 This is an important question because it is hard to accept that 
federalism is the key to guaranteeing individual liberties given states’ ab-
ysmal track record in defending such liberties.171 
  
measures. See infra Part III.B.3.b. 
164. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in 
itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.’”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
165. See infra note 171; Cross, supra note 154, at 1306–07 (1999) (“Federalism’s role in American 
history as a stalking horse for racism is infamous. Southern states invoked states’ rights in an effort to 
preserve first slavery and then segregation.”). Although Justice Brennan long argued that states have 
an important role in filling gaps in the federal government’s protection of individual constitutional 
rights, he also stressed the need for strong federal enforcement. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of 
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
166. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
167. Id. at 458. 
168. Althouse, supra note 155, at 1009. 
169. See infra note 171. 
170. Cf. Althouse, supra note 155, at 1021 (“Serious scrutiny of the state courts’ work ought to 
precede deference” to those courts.). 
171. PETER SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW 94 (2000) (stating that federalism has “nourished some 
of America’s most repellent and repressive political regimes”); Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Politi-
cal Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1235 (2001); see also Theodore W. 
Ruger, New Federalism: Introduction, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 91 (2004) (describing states’ 
opposition to “emancipation, antidiscrimination laws, [and] wages-and-hours legislation” and states’ 
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In spite of the purported advantages of federalism, one could argue 
that this form of governance inhibits solutions to national problems and 
allows states to pursue policies that are anathema to the rest of society.172 
A more pragmatic approach—one that looks to the history of states’ re-
spect for individual liberty and considers the likely effects of state regula-
tion—would do much to avoid such problems. 
To be sure, predicting policy outcomes is not an exact science.173 
However, even an attempt at prediction would likely remedy many exist-
ing problems and result in better policy decisions. One example of a 
pragmatic look at federalism is the work of Professor Frank Cross. He has 
emphasized that many of federalism’s purported benefits actually relate to 
decentralization which, perhaps ironically, is more prevalent in nonfedera-
listic countries.174 Cross also appropriately questions whether the benefits 
attributed to federalism and decentralization actually exist in the real 
world, and his attempt to find empirical support for these claims is exactly 
the type of pragmatic approach that workplace policymakers should 
adopt.175 
Although there is little data on federalism’s effect on workplace laws, 
the theoretical advantages of federalism do not appear to have come to 
fruition in the workplace.176 To the extent that federalism may provide 
some benefit, that positive effect seems to be outweighed by the costs in-
curred by the complexity that accompanies state regulation of the 
workplace.177 The reality is that the current federalist approach to 
workplace regulation is a relic that has no place in the modern economy.  
2. A National Workplace Law for a National (and International) 
Economy 
At least four general approaches to apportioning regulatory authority 
between federal and state governments exist: exclusive federal authority; 
  
support for “slavery, segregation, child labor and underenforcement of domestic violence laws”); 
Super, supra note 153, at 2614 (noting that states have hidden biases against programs intended to 
serve low- and middle-income people). 
172. See infra notes 182–189 and accompanying text. 
173. Super, supra note 153 at 2553–54 (discussing the shortcomings in applying “comparative 
process theory” of federalism, which argues that responsibility should be allocated to state or federal 
governments based on which system generates the best outcomes, to fiscal policy). 
174. Cross, supra note 153, at 19–21, 27–29, 46–49. 
175. Cross, supra note 153, at 52–57; Cross, supra note 153, at 59 (“[D]ecisions about federalism 
. . . should be grounded in a pragmatic assessment of their consequences. Dedication to preservation 
and empowerment of state sovereignty, in its own intrinsic right, is insupportable, and the presumption 
should be to the contrary.”). 
176. Admittedly, this conclusion is based on theory more than is ideal. However, pragmatic evalua-
tion of policy does the best it can with the available information—the key is maintaining enough flex-
ibility to change course should better information arise that undermines earlier determinations. 
177. See supra Part II.B. 
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exclusive state authority; concurrent state and federal authority; and exclu-
sive federal authority over some areas, with exclusive state authority over 
others. Our current workplace regulatory system is a mix of the latter two 
options—combining concurrent jurisdiction in some areas with exclusive 
control by either federal or state governments over others. As noted, this 
system has led to numerous problems, prompting the need to seek a better 
form of regulation. A more pragmatic solution would be the first ap-
proach, as exclusive federal authority over all workplace matters provides 
the best hope for achieving the optimal level of regulation and enforce-
ment. 
In the past, relying on state regulation of the workplace made sense, as 
the economy was dominated by small businesses and agriculture—entities 
that were truly local in scope.178 However, such workplaces play a far 
smaller role in the current economic environment. Many employers are at 
least regional, if not national or international, in scope.179 Even many local 
employers have workers who cross state lines to make sales or engage in 
other business. Except for truly small and local employers, which are al-
ready exempted from most federal workplace laws, there is little reason 
for workplaces to be governed by the states. Indeed, there are many rea-
sons why modern workplaces should not be subjected to state regulation, 
particularly the costs of redundant or inconsistent rules.180 Exclusive fed-
eral regulation would eliminate such inefficiencies and provide more effec-
tive governance.181 
State regulation of the workplace also causes economically inefficient 
externalities that may result in a “race to the bottom”182 that hurts not only 
workers, but state and national economies as well. Many states compete 
with each other by lowering labor costs to attract employers. This strategy 
comes as no surprise, for companies generally seek locations that offer 
lower labor costs, including less labor regulation.183 Yet, more important 
than the actual impact of labor costs on firm decision making is the per-
ception among state policymakers that labor costs are important to attract-
  
178. See supra Part II.A; Befort, supra note 49, at 385–86. 
179. Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise 
of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 696, 699 (1994) (stating that the U.S. “economy became 
a national economy during the late nineteenth century,” when at-will employment gained widespread 
acceptance). 
180. See supra Part II.B.2. 
181. But cf. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE DECISIONS IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD 180–83 (1999) (arguing for environmental deregulation). 
182. Bales, supra note 50 (discussing inter-jurisdictional employment standards competition, in-
cluding states’ use of at-will doctrine to attract capital). 
183. Laura Bloodgood, Inbound and Outbound U.S. Direct Investment with Leading Partner Coun-
tries, J. INT’L COM. & ECON., Aug. 2008, at 63, 68; Geoffrey Kercsmar, Protecting the Golden 
Goose: Canadian Union Security Agreements and Competitiveness in the Age of NAFTA, 15 DICK. J. 
INT’L L. 593, 608 (1997) (discussing firms’ concern with labor costs and citing evidence that half of 
American companies view state right-to-work laws as necessary to locate in particular state). 
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ing business.184 As long as these policymakers hold this belief, and expe-
rience shows that many do,185 then their workplace regulations will reflect 
that belief as well. 
Although possibly successful in the short term, this strategy is destined 
to fail—with negative consequences for the nation as a whole. Even the 
state with the cheapest labor costs in the United States will never be able 
to compete on those terms globally.186 A large number of countries are 
able to offer significantly lower labor costs than any American state; thus, 
states that compete for business on this ground will at most be more attrac-
tive to companies that have already decided to stay in the United States. 
That small benefit is outweighed by the detrimental effects of selling the 
state as a source of cheap labor.187 Far better would be to take advantage 
of the United States’ comparative advantage—skilled labor. States that 
stress education and high-quality standards of living will be able to attract 
and train better workers, and it is those states that will be able to compete 
globally in the long run.188 The cheap-labor states may have gained jobs 
from other states in the short term, but they are chasing a shrinking mar-
ket. Many types of low-skilled jobs will continue to move overseas, and 
states that have a disproportionate share of those jobs will find themselves 
with far poorer employment prospects than the high labor cost states they 
initially “beat.”189 A national workplace policy would avoid much of this 
race-to-the-bottom problem by eliminating interstate labor-cost competi-
tion.190 
States also fail to consider the costs of their decisions to the nation as a 
whole. The spillover effects caused by a state’s failure to invest in high-
  
184. Cf. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To 
the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 348 (1997) (noting that state officials’ perception that strong 
environmental enforcement drives out businesses matters more than actual effects on business migra-
tion). 
185. Glynn, supra note 78 (noting that some states try to use their regulation, or lack thereof, of 
noncompetition agreements to attract business); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global 
Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987, 990–97 
(1995). 
186. Larry Swisher, House Democratic Leaders Vows To Address Impacts of Globalization, Off-
shoring of Jobs, 134 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Jul. 13, 2007, at A-11 (quoting Princeton economist 
Alan Blinder: “Because routine, impersonal service jobs that can be done anywhere in the world will 
be at risk of moving to other countries, many of the most valuable skills for the jobs that remain will 
require interpersonal skills, problem-solving abilities, and creativity.”); see also Bales, supra note 50 
(discussing U.S. options to compete in global labor market). 
187. Bales, supra note 50; see also John Leland, As Iowa Job Surplus Grows, Workers Call the 
Shots, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, at A14 (describing workers leaving Iowa because of low wages). 
188. Peter S. Goodman, In N.C., A Second Industrial Revolution; Biotech Surge Shows Manufac-
turing Still Key to U.S. Economy, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2007, at A1 (stating that successful manufac-
turing in the U.S. relies largely on goods and processes requiring higher skilled labor). 
189. Bales, supra note 50; cf. Cross, supra note 153, at 15–18 (arguing that the environmental 
race-to-the-bottom argument has some merit, but is complicated). 
190. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 408 (1997). 
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skill job training are externalities that justify a national policy.191 These 
externalities represent a suboptimal level of regulation because policymak-
ers implement regulations based only on the costs to their state rather than 
to the entire country. Federal policymaking, however, necessarily consid-
ers national costs, thereby avoiding these economically inefficient policies. 
Structural differences between federal and state governments also 
weigh in favor of a national approach to workplace regulation. Most state 
legislator positions are part-time; thus, state policymakers possess far less 
time, resources, and expertise than their full-time federal counterparts.192 
The federal government, although far from perfect, is also more transpa-
rent and accessible than most state governments—and thereby more ac-
countable.193 This transparency and accessibility is especially beneficial for 
groups, such as employee advocates, which have fewer resources than 
their opposition.194 Employers will always be able to influence every level 
of government that has control over their interests, whether federal or 
state. In contrast, employee-side groups have far fewer resources. By fo-
cusing policymaking in one jurisdiction, employee advocates would be 
able to participate in all workplace policymaking, rather than forfeiting 
certain state decisions because of resource-allocation concerns. The re-
sources available to each side will never be equal, but concentrating deci-
sion-making authority in the federal government would at least allow all 
sides to be in the game. 
Certain types of workplace regulations also involve very high fixed 
costs that are much better suited to centralized regulation. Safety and 
health regulations, in particular, often demand extensive research and in-
vestigation. The federal OSHA statute has a host of problems,195 particu-
larly a lack of adequate funding, but it is difficult to imagine that state 
governments could do better.196 Indeed, a federalist approach to OSHA 
regulations would incur a significant waste of resources. It makes no sense 
to have multiple regulators investigate the same workplace health and safe-
ty risks; it is far more efficient to have a single, central authority perform 
  
191. Id. at 407. 
192. Andrew Stengel et al., Still Broken: New York State Legislative Reform (2008), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/still_broken_new_york_state_legislative_reform_2008
_update/; cf. McCormick, supra note 4, at 207–08 (citing problems with states’ enforcement of antidi-
scrimination laws). 
193. Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized 
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009); Legislative Reform, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 73–74 
(2003). 
194. But see Hodges, supra note 98, at 603 (noting that major changes raise risks for groups with 
fewer resources). 
195. Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace 
Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1080–81 (2005). 
196. States currently possess limited authority to regulate workplace health and safety. RICHARD A. 
BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 252–53 
(2007) 
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that task.197 Even with a high level of information sharing among states—
which is unrealistic to expect—different regulators will be forced to repeat 
research and to devise often complicated rules governing these workplace 
risks. There may be some advantage to dissimilar regulations in different 
jurisdictions, but these benefits are likely outweighed by their costs. 
Moreover, in the limited circumstances where dissimilarity makes sense, 
federal policymakers could allow for some variance among jurisdictions. 
3. The Failed Promise of Workplace Federalism 
The proposal to nationalize workplace law has already prompted criti-
cism. Some objections seem to be motivated primarily by a fear of the 
unknown—an expected reaction given the revolutionary nature of the pro-
posed change, yet not one that should stand in the way of possible im-
provements.198 Others defend our current system as providing the best 
chance for expanding workers’ rights, an argument that is tied to the pur-
ported advantages of federalism.199 
Although many theories have been raised in support of federalism 
generally,200 two of the primary rationales for workplace federalism are 
that the best policies arise from states experimenting with different 
workplace laws and that state regulations can provide a political catalyst to 
speed enactment of federal workplace laws.201 Those theories may be per-
suasive in some areas of the law; however, their benefits are far harder to 
see in the workplace. 
a. Laboratory Theory 
A major argument in favor of workplace federalism is that state regu-
lations can act as experiments that ultimately result in better policymak-
ing.202 Yet, evidence that such experimentation actually occurs in 
workplace law is wanting. Although state workplace regulations have 
spread nationally at times, more often than not states simply choose from a 
menu of preexisting options depending on their political composition at the 
  
197. An alternative would be a central research agency that shares information with state regula-
tors. However, that requires a higher level of information sharing and state-level expertise than is 
realistic. 
198. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
199. Secunda, supra note 8; infra notes 269–272 and accompanying text; cf. JAMES WEINSTEIN, 
THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900–1918 (1968) (describing the railroads’ ability to 
obtain less restrictive federal regulations to replace state rules). 
200. Supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text; Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in 
Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 
354–59 (2007) (discussing benefits of workplace federalism). 
201. Other purported advantages of federalism, including opening up the political process, have 
less relevance in the workplace. See supra notes 160–164, 192–197 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra note 160. 
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time. Some exceptions exist,203 but they are too rare to outweigh the com-
plications caused by state governance. Further, workplace federalism may 
also suppress the development of laws at the federal level.204 
More generally, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that there 
are two major problems with the experimentation theory of federalism.205 
The first is a free-rider problem caused by jurisdictions’ preference to 
borrow the innovations or experiments of other jurisdictions rather than 
incur the expense of implementing their own.206 This problem is particu-
larly acute where information about another jurisdiction’s innovation is 
cheap to obtain, such as with public laws and regulations.207 This results in 
a suboptimal level of innovation unless some central authority can enact 
measures to overcome this collective-action problem.208 
The second issue is an agency problem in which incumbent policy-
makers, who are typically risk averse, may be unwilling to engage in ex-
periments that would benefit the jurisdiction as a whole.209 The possibility 
of free-riding makes policymakers in federalist systems more risk averse 
than unitary systems because the opportunity to copy innovations means 
that the public will prefer the policymaker to free ride rather than risk 
their own resources.210 This problem prevents a jurisdiction from capturing 
all of the societal gains of innovation, thereby resulting in underinvestment 
and a suboptimal level of innovation.211 
Although Rose-Ackerman’s critique of federalism has not gained trac-
tion in many quarters, recent work by professors Brian Galle and Joseph 
  
203. See infra note 229. 
204. See infra note 227. 
205. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking And Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). 
206. Id. at 604. “Innovation” refers generally to new policies while “experimentation” refers to 
different means of implementing a given policy. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will use “inno-
vation” to include both ideas. 
207. Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents, 
Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 545 (1995) (describing the inability to “patent” 
corporate law innovation and protect them from copying by other states); Galle & Leahy, supra note 
193, at 1351. 
208. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1335–36. 
209. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 205, at 614–15. Galle and Leahy raise the possibility that self-
serving policymakers could provide net social gains by disregarding their constituents’ risk aversion, 
but argue that policymakers are likely to be more, not less, risk averse than the public. Galle & Leahy, 
supra note 193, at 1371–75. A similar problem is common in firms, where managers may have inter-
ests that differ from those of shareholders or the firm as a whole. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. 
Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 337–38 (1995); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 35 (1986); 
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 571 (1995). 
210. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1370. Galle and Leahy note the “empirical observation that 
marginal innovation [the amount of innovation added by a new jurisdiction] appears to diminish as the 
number of jurisdictions increases.” Id. at n. 81. 
211. In some areas, such as law governing corporate charters, some of these problems can be 
overcome if there is an advantage to being the first to implement an innovation. See Glynn, supra note 
78. However, there is little competitive benefit to being the first to innovate in workplace law. 
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Leahy has breathed new life into the idea that federalism does not neces-
sarily lead to more experimentation.212 Galle and Leahy synthesize a long 
history of research on innovation in decentralized systems to test Rose-
Ackerman’s thesis. Their central conclusion is that Rose-Ackerman was 
justified in doubting federalism’s ability to spur innovation.213 
Although state governments innovate, according to Galle and Leahy, 
“they are unlikely [to do so] in all instances at the optimal social level, or 
in a way that captures the true benefits of experimentation.”214 Suboptimal 
levels of innovation are most likely to occur where innovation is useful to 
other jurisdictions, there are inexpensive means to gain information about 
others’ innovations, and it is cheap to copy such innovations.215 All of 
these conditions apply to workplace law. Regulations are matters of public 
knowledge, and the differences in workplace conditions among states are 
small enough to make the borrowing of policies worthwhile. 
This inability to achieve an optimal level of innovation may warrant a 
centralized, federal system of regulation that can correct the market fail-
ures of state governance. Although one can point to examples of state 
workplace innovation, these examples do not undermine the idea that the 
level of such innovation falls below what an ideal central regulator would 
enact.216 Federal governance, of course, is not ideal. However, Galle and 
Leahy argue that federal governance is in a better position to achieve or 
approach an optimal level of regulation, not that it will do so in every in-
stance.217 That is the exact point of the proposal to nationalize workplace 
law: the federal government is better situated to achieve an optimal level 
of workplace innovation and regulation than are state governments. Even 
if federal governance does not result in the best outcome in every instance, 
exclusive federal authority provides the best chance for our workplace 
governance system to approach the optimal level of regulation. 
Further, if real experimentation is to occur, at least one jurisdiction 
must adopt a policy that looks less likely to be successful.218 But this is 
unlikely to occur even in a federalist system, as the political costs of such 
risk-taking are too high. In contrast, a central authority could force such 
experimentation among its subdivisions.219 This problem is reflected in 
  
212. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193; see also Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: 
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 924–26 (1994) (noting that a unitary 
government could encourage experimentation among sub-units). 
213. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1398–1400. 
214. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1338 n.19.  
215. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1399–1400. 
216. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1343 n. 37. 
217. Galle and Leahy also recognize the shortcomings of federal regulation and raise the possibility 
that private firms or hybrid state/private entities may provide a beneficial alternative. Galle & Leahy, 
supra note 193, at 1400. 
218. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 212, at 925. 
219. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
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workplace law, where there is not a wide assortment of state rules. More 
often than not, states simply choose from a limited set of existing policy 
choices based on their political demographics, rather than an attempt to 
innovate.220 Accordingly, the workplace law differences among states gen-
erally do not represent true innovation or an attempt to discover the best 
policy. 
Even where workplace innovation does occur, it is quite limited and is 
often located in larger states and municipalities.221 This is likely due to the 
economies of scale in acquiring the expertise needed to create innovative 
policy.222 Thus, there are still suboptimal levels of innovation among the 
substantial number of states too small to afford true innovation. In con-
trast, the federal government has a broader expertise and larger bureau-
cracy than any state and is therefore in the best position to innovate. 
b. Political Catalyst Theory 
Where state regulation is most likely to have a positive effect is in lay-
ing the groundwork for new laws, particularly controversial ones.223 By 
incrementally enacting measures in smaller geographical areas, state gov-
ernments could lessen resistance to certain regulations, which would ulti-
mately result in the passage of federal legislation more rapidly than under 
a nationalized workplace system. A recent example is the attempt to ban 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.224 There is a 
plausible argument that the experience of a handful of states is helping the 
development of federal law that would ban sexual orientation discrimina-
tion at work.225 It is unclear whether the federal government is acting at 
the same speed it would have absent these state laws—indeed, although 
sexual orientation discrimination has been prohibited in the federal 
workplace for many years,226 there is still no federal protection that applies 
to private employers—but it is fair to say that states’ experiences will 
  
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–23 (2008) (suggesting ways to prompt local experimentation). 
220. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1368 (discussing states’ tendency to “pluck what seem to 
them to be the lowest hanging new fruits, rather than sorting among all of the available alternatives to 
select the most appealing”). 
221. For instance, California is generally considered to have relatively expansive protections for 
workers.  
222. Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1367. 
223. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007).  
224. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 209, 209–10 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ lawreview/Colloquy/2008/ 
43/ LRColl2008n43 Hendricks.pdf (describing recent legislative action to enact the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA)).  
225. Of course, Congress has yet to pass ENDA, and the fact that its prospects are looking better is 
more the result of changes in federal politics than state policymaking. 
226. Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39775 (June 23, 2000). 
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make any future federal legislation easier. However, shortening the time-
line for the development of a few laws does not mean that workplace fede-
ralism makes sense generally. 
It is also possible that, absent state authority in this area, the federal 
government may have been more aggressive about developing protections 
for sexual orientation. Take, for example, the statement of one senator in 
defense of Congress’s rejection of the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act (ENDA) of 1996, which would have added sexual orientation to Title 
VII’s protected classes: 
If this Congress had adopted ENDA, we would have ended State 
experimentation and forced one uniform solution—punitive dam-
ages and all—onto every State. Rejecting ENDA is the choice that 
leaves the States free to adopt whatever policies they choose. 
Thus, from a federalism perspective, ENDA was an intrusion on 
the States’ ability to make choices . . . .227 
This statement serves as a useful reminder that concurrent state legislation 
does not necessarily result in more workplace protections. It is impossible 
to know whether legislators who cite states’ rights arguments are truly 
supporting state autonomy rather than merely using that argument as a 
convenient political tool. Yet eliminating concurrent federal and state go-
vernance would also eliminate the ability of policymakers to use state law 
as an excuse not to enact national workplace legislation. 
It is important to note as well that a centralized government can often 
move faster and more effectively than a federalist system, particularly in 
reaction to changing circumstances. The FMLA is a good example of the 
federal government, while not the first jurisdiction to act, taking the lead 
in implementing broad family and medical leave protections for workers. 
Although some state measures existed before the FMLA, they were signif-
icantly more limited than the federal act.228 Indeed, Congress’s action was 
the catalyst for most of the FMLA-like state laws that exist today.229 
  
227. 142 CONG. REC. S12015-01, S12016 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham). 
228. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733–34 (2003) (noting women-only 
childcare leave policies and lack of family leave requirements). But see Henry Drummonds, Beyond 
the Employee Free Choice Act Debate: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 
19 CORN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 118–19, n.188 (2009) (citing the FMLA as one example of the 
advantages of state authority).  
229. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. 538 U.S. at 732–33 (citing S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 20 (1993), and S. 
Rep. No. 102-68, at 77 (1991)). A notable counter example is state employment protection for dis-
abled private-sector workers. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5 
(2001); see also William A. Herbert & Amelia K. Tuminaro, The Impact of Emerging Technologies in 
the Workplace: Who’s Watching the Man (Who’s Watching Me)?, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 
365–66 (2008) (discussing state genetic discrimination laws). But see supra note 158. 
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Finally, if Congress implemented the proposal to nationalize 
workplace law, it could do so in a manner that takes advantage of states’ 
ability to act as a catalyst. Congress would need to affirmatively preempt 
various areas of state workplace law to avoid leaving regulatory gaps in 
areas that the federal government has not yet addressed. During this tran-
sition phase, state regulation in a given area would continue to develop 
until the federal government takes over. Moreover, the federal govern-
ment could allow limited instances of state regulation in areas in which it 
believed that experimentation would be especially beneficial.230 Only a 
national workplace regime can take into account such circumstances while 
eliminating many of the problems associated with our current federalist 
model of workplace regulation. 
C. The Federal Workplace Code 
The manner in which Congress would nationalize workplace law is of 
obvious importance. The effect of such a monumental change would de-
pend on, among other things, decisions about which legal claims would be 
nationalized, how the federal government would exercise its expanded 
authority, and how such claims would be adjudicated. These questions are 
complex and warrant an article unto themselves. What follows, therefore, 
is merely the broad outline of a possible nationalized workplace regulatory 
system. 
As briefly described below, this federal workplace code would literal-
ly cover all workplace issues by replacing all statutory, administrative, and 
common-law workplace rules from all jurisdictions, whether federal or 
state. The transition to a federal workplace code need not, and should not, 
be instantaneous. Preemption of state law would occur in phases to avoid 
creating legal vacuums in areas where there is currently no federal law 
and, in isolated circumstances, would allow for some state governance.231 
The federal workplace code would also involve a serious attempt to 
horizontally integrate nationalized workplace rules. The various standards, 
definitions, procedures, and other aspects of those rules would be stream-
lined as much as possible. Although some particularly unique areas would 
require specific requirements, most areas could be merged. Moreover, 
authority to interpret and enforce the new code would fall to a single fed-
eral administrative agency, while attempts would be made to simplify ad-
judication of disputes and to broaden access to the adjudicatory process.  
  
230. For example, states may have acquired expertise in differences between western and eastern 
coal deposits that require unique mine safety regulations. Cf. William S. Mattingly, If Due Process is 
a Big Tent, Why Do Some Feel Excluded From the Big Top?, 105 W.VA. L. REV. 791, 801 (2003) 
(noting change in health risk to miners because of shift from eastern underground mines to western 
strip mines). 
231. See id. 
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1. Which Law To Nationalize? 
The first issue for the new federal workplace code is to identify which 
state laws it would nationalize. The quick answer is virtually all of them. 
One of the main advantages of vertical integration is to bring the large and 
diverse set of laws regulating the workplace under one regulatory umbrel-
la. Making the coverage of the new federal workplace code as broad as 
possible would also provide more opportunities to horizontally integrate 
laws. 
The most obvious areas for coverage are those claims that strike at the 
heart of the employment relationship. These areas include all current fed-
eral workplace laws, such as those dealing with discrimination, collective 
action, wage and hour claims, and employee benefits. However, areas that 
only affect the workplace tangentially, like Social Security law, need not 
be included under the federal workplace code. 
State law is a more vexing question. State claims directly related to the 
workplace are obvious candidates for preemption—including state-level 
discrimination and wage and hour laws, the at-will default and its excep-
tions,232 unemployment insurance,233 and workers’ compensation.234 Other 
areas may be relevant in the workplace, but are not primarily workplace 
laws. These indirect workplace claims include common law torts—such as 
defamation, intentional interference with business relations, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress—as well as trade secret and other intellec-
tual property regulations. Although there is a risk of unnecessarily inter-
fering with these areas of state law, the federal code should include such 
claims as they apply to the workplace absent a specific reason not to do 
so. Failing to nationalize these areas would maintain some of the confus-
ing myriad of laws plaguing the current system of workplace rules. More-
over, courts have struggled to apply these laws to the workplace, often 
creating special rules for such cases.235 Thus, there is little lost and much 
to be gained by simply carving out these special workplace rules from 
each area of law and including them in the federal workplace code. 
  
232. See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 
-915 (2007) (establishing limited just-cause termination requirement). 
233. Unemployment insurance programs were created under the auspices of the federal govern-
ment, but are operated by the states. See Bales et al., supra note 196, at 180–81. 
234. State employees would also be included. See Hirsch, supra note 99, at 117–18 (discussing 
application of unitary federal rule to state employees without running afoul of sovereign immunity 
interests). 
235. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (refus-
ing to apply covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contract). 
File: HIRSCH EIC PUBLISH.doc Created on:  12/6/2010 2:25:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2010 3:28:00 PM 
1066 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 61:5:1025 
 
2. Horizontal Integration: Streamlining Workplace Law and its En-
forcement 
After eliminating state authority over the workplace, one of the most 
important changes wrought by the new federal workplace code would be 
to consolidate and streamline workplace rules and their enforcement. Al-
though there are limits to the degree of simplification possible, the level of 
duplication and other inefficiencies that exist today leave plenty of oppor-
tunities. The most fruitful areas for this horizontal integration include sta-
tutory differences involving substantive standards, procedural rules, and 
coverage issues. 
One of the more confusing elements of workplace litigation is that dif-
ferent claims, even if they involve similar issues, often require significant-
ly different analyses. The new federal code could dramatically streamline 
workplace litigation by giving most claims the same standard for issues 
such as the level of causation, the burdens required of each party, and 
affirmative defenses. Procedural issues are ripe for consolidation as well. 
Even if a dispute centers on a single event—a termination, for instance—
there may be several different statutes of limitation, filing requirements, 
and other procedural requirements, depending on the alleged claims. Most 
of these differences impose costs on parties, yet have few benefits. 
The disparate coverage standards under today’s workplace laws are 
perhaps the best example of this problem. Issues such as the definition of 
an employer or employee differ significantly depending on the claim. 
Thus, in a case involving the same employer and a single set of facts, a 
worker may be considered a covered employee for one claim but not 
another. Although there may be support for some of these differences,236 
the small benefit gained by expanding or contracting these definitions in 
certain contexts pales in comparison to the costs that result from this lack 
of consistency. 
For example, the three primary federal antidiscrimination laws have 
small but important differences in their small-employer exemption. Title 
VII and the ADA apply to employers with fifteen employees, while the 
ADEA requires twenty employees.237 Even if one considered age discrimi-
nation to be less serious, there is little to be gained from the relatively 
small difference among the minimum number of employees—yet there is 
much to be lost. These antidiscrimination statutes are similar in their gen-
eral regulatory approach. It does not make sense, therefore, to require 
  
236. Sec’y of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing need for 
more expansive definition of “employee” under FLSA). FMLA leave requirements may also impose 
such a significant toll on truly small employers that a broader employee or employer exclusion may be 
justified. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006). 
237. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (2006) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5) (ADA). 
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employers with fifteen to nineteen employees to comply with Title VII and 
the ADA, but not the ADEA. Indeed, the difficulties in complying with 
the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirements would suggest that of 
the three statutes, the ADA would be most likely to exempt small employ-
ers.238 Thus, the federal workplace code could improve this suboptimal 
situation by making all, or nearly all, workplace rules apply to the same 
employers—for instance, by exempting all firms with less than five em-
ployees.239 This change would improve compliance and enforcement of 
workplace rules, while imposing few additional costs. 
Finally, the workplace code could integrate and improve the means of 
adjudication and administration. The multiple forums often required to 
resolve a distinct workplace dispute is a significant problem that could be 
eliminated by creating a single adjudicatory body. Some form of federal 
Article III court, whether a general court or a specialized workplace 
court,240 probably provides the best level of expertise and protection for 
parties, although other models—such as arbitration—could work as well.241 
Our current adjudicatory model also creates an access problem in 
which many low-wage workers are unable to litigate their claims. There is 
no easy solution to this problem, as even arbitration can be costly. How-
ever, a new federal workplace regime could address this issue as part of 
the substantial reforms necessary to nationalize workplace law. There are 
no magic bullets, but one option would be to establish workplace small 
claims courts, perhaps in conjunction with the more formal specialized 
workplace court. These courts could also emphasize mediation, but still 
allow a judge to resolve a dispute in a short hearing that dispenses with the 
  
238. Cf. Robert Blackburn & Mark Hart, Employment Rights in Small Firms: Some New Evidence, 
Explanations and Implications, 32 INDUS. L.J. 60, 65 (2003) (describing survey showing that British 
employment statute imposed disproportionate compliance costs on small employers).  
239. This threshold would exclude approximately 11% of all firms in the United States and 5% of 
all employees. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS ABOUT BUSINESS SIZE: 2004, Table 2(a) (2007), 
available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html. Policymakers could make limited 
exceptions to this exclusion, such as ensuring that all employees are covered by minimum wage guar-
antees. 
240. See infra notes 284–285 and accompanying text; Hodges, supra note 75, at 623–24 (discussing 
effectiveness of abritration as an alternative method for resolving labor claims); Morris, supra note 33, 
at 499–500, 505. Mexico, for instance, gives its labor courts exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes 
between employers and employees. Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Reform in Mexico: A Study of 
Old and New Insolvency Proceedings, 31 INT’L BUS. L. 131, 132 (2003); see also Guy Davidov, 
Unbound: Some Comments on Israel’s Judicially-Developed Labor Law, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 
J. 283 (2009) (discussing Israel’s National Labour Court). But see James J. Brudney et al., Judicial 
Hostility Towards Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1763–64 (1999) (questioning whether specialized court provides more benefits 
than costs).  
241. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 124–26; see Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for 
Adjudication of Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund, eds. forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656618. 
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time and expense of attorney-conducted litigation.242 Although this type of 
dispute resolution is not as thorough as formal litigation, it is far better 
than what most low-wage employees get now—nothing. 
Horizontal integration promises more effective compliance and en-
forcement of workplace rules. By eliminating much of the complexity that 
exists in today’s workplace cases, integration can reduce the costs of em-
ployer compliance with the rules, the hurdles to employees’ understanding 
of their protections, and the inefficiencies in adjudicating claims.243 
D. Doomed by History?: Past Nationalization Attempts 
The proposal to nationalize workplace law raises reasonable questions 
about the federal government’s ability to exercise such power. A logical 
focus of this inquiry is to examine two major federal workplace laws that 
currently preempt most state regulations: ERISA and the NLRA.244 Nei-
ther statute is the paradigm of success, as they suffer at times from com-
plicated statutory provisions and poor enforcement—failures that serve as 
a warning about the risks of nationalizing the entire workplace law system. 
Yet, such problems do not necessarily undermine the argument for natio-
nalization. No regulatory system is without fault, so it is no surprise that 
major statutes such as ERISA and the NLRA have problems. The more 
important question is whether, despite their faults, ERISA and the NLRA 
are superior to state regulation over their respective areas. Although im-
possible to determine with certainty, federal preemption in these areas 
appears to be more favorable than the alternative. 
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Too Little Preemption? 
Regulation of pensions and other employee benefits is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Save for some isolated cases and statutes, there had been no 
serious attempt to regulate employee benefits at the federal or state level 
until Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.245 Policymakers realized that a 
unitary national standard was needed to protect promised employee bene-
  
242. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Com-
pliance Through Consent, 18 L. & SOC’Y REV. 11, 20–22 (1984).  
243. Cf. Congressman Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47 SMU L. REV. 37, 48 (1993) 
(stating that “[e]mployers, especially small employers, find it difficult to comply with the complex 
laws governing pension plans for their employees. Since establishing or continuing a plan is voluntary, 
this complexity deters some employers from establishing pension plans and also causes others to ter-
minate existing plans.”). 
244. The NLRA does not apply to public employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).  
245. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006) (preempting “any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” regulated by ERISA). Instead of United States Code 
citations, this article will refer to the original act’s sections, such as “ERISA § 514,” rather than “29 
U.S.C. § 1144(a).” 
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fits; thus, ERISA’s preemption of state governance was a major justifica-
tion for the act.246 
The problems with the regulation of employee benefit plans prior to 
ERISA are a microcosm of the problems with today’s workplace laws. 
Prior to ERISA, regulation of pensions and other benefits was haphazard. 
For the most part, pre-ERISA employee-benefit regulation consisted of 
disparate rules emanating from various state court decisions.247 The federal 
government encouraged private retirement plans through tax incentives 
and favorable labor law rulings that gave unions increased opportunities to 
implement such plans.248 Yet, federal regulation of those plans was li-
mited. Congress enacted several statutes that regulated various aspects of 
employee benefits, but only in a piecemeal fashion.249 The result was that, 
despite some limits,250 employers and unions had a significant degree of 
freedom in how they established and administered plans. However, this 
freedom came with costs. Employers and unions had no restrictions on the 
terms they created for pension plans, nor did they have to ensure that the 
promises they made were secure.251 Eradicating the inevitable abuses of 
this freedom became one of the major goals of ERISA. 
The incomplete patchwork of state employee-benefit rules was another 
concern of Congress when it enacted ERISA and its broad preemption of 
state regulation. Indeed, the legislative history surrounding ERISA’s 
preemption provision explicitly emphasized the importance of centralizing 
regulatory power within the federal government and avoiding disparate 
state rules governing employee benefits.252 
Opposition to ERISA from employers and unions had been fierce, but 
quickly dissipated once the threat of increased state regulation became 
  
246. James Wooten has written an informative account of the history of ERISA preemption. See 
James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part 2, 14 J. PENSION 
BENEFITS 5 (2007); James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part 
1, 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31 (2006); see also JAMES A WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT 
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004); James D. Hutchinson & David M. 
Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 34–43 (1978); Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the 
New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999). 
247. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 31. 
248. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 32. 
249. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1947) (regulating union-run 
employee benefit plans); Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301 (repealed 1974) 
(mandating disclosure and filing requirements for employee benefit plans). 
250. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 32 (noting antidiscrimination and reporting requirements). 
251. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 32. 
252. H.R. CONF. REP. NO.1280, 93d CONG., 1974 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5038, 5162 (stating that “provi-
sions of title I are to supersede all State laws that relate to any employee benefit plan that is established 
by an employer engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that 
represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce”); 120 CONG. REC. 29,928, 29,933 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (“It should be stressed that [ERISA is] . . . intended to preempt 
the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and 
local regulation of employee benefit plans.”); see generally Vranka, supra note 97, at 613–14. 
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real.253 Although some states had begun to promulgate limited regulations 
of pensions prior to ERISA’s enactment, they were the rare exceptions to 
a generally laissez-faire regulatory stance.254 By the early 1970s, however, 
more state courts and legislatures began considering, or actually engaging 
in, pension governance.255 Groups that initially opposed federal regulation 
then had a new, greater concern: the possibility of inconsistent state 
pension requirements.256 That threat extended to welfare plans, which 
states had also started to express an interest in regulating.257 Ultimately, 
the fear of state regulation was significant enough to shift employers’ and 
unions’ support. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, its promise of unifying employee ben-
efit law, ERISA has faced widespread criticism. That criticism includes 
many of the problems associated with today’s workplace regulatory sys-
tem, such as unnecessary complexity and ineffective enforcement.258 Yet, 
even if all of those criticisms are true, ERISA is not necessarily a failure. 
Indeed, the proper comparison is not ERISA’s performance vis-à-vis an 
ideal framework. Rather, pragmatic policymaking should evaluate whether 
ERISA does a better job protecting employee benefits than the system it 
replaced or the system that would have existed if ERISA had not been 
enacted. In spite of its problems, ERISA’s elimination of state authority 
over employee benefits seems to have been a wise policy decision. 
Many of the criticisms of ERISA are targeted to shortcomings related 
to its substantive provisions.259 Those problems only serve to strengthen 
the argument for preemption. It is possible that some states could have 
done a better job than Congress in establishing employee benefit rules. It 
is also a near-certainty, however, that some states would have done worse. 
The result would be a wide variety of rules—some better, some the same, 
  
253. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34. Unions that were not primary plan administrators were 
supportive of federal pension regulation. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 33. 
254. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34. 
255. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34. 
256. Wooten, Part 2, supra note 246, at 10 (quoting legislative history); see also Wooten, Part 1, 
supra note 245, at 34 (citing legislative history describing dangers of state regulation); Note, Self-
Insured Employee Welfare Plans and the 501(c)(9) Trust: The Specter of State Regulation, 43 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 325 (1974). 
257. Wooten, Part 2, supra note 246, at 10. “Welfare plans” refers to plans “established and 
maintained by employers to provide benefit programs that include health, disability, and life insurance; 
training programs; reimbursement for day care centers; scholarship funds; and prepaid legal services.” 
Bales et al., supra note 196, at 199 (citing ERISA § 3(1)). 
258. Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 231–34 (2007) (describing ERISA preemption analysis); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 476–77 (2004) (arguing that 
“inflexibility, impenetrability, and administrative costs associated with ERISA’s defined benefit mini-
mum funding rules are, for many employers, a significant deterrent to establishing or continuing 
defined benefit plans, particularly when those rules are contrasted with the greater flexibility, transpa-
rency, and simplicity of the rules governing profit-sharing plans”). 
259. See supra note 258. 
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and some worse than ERISA. No matter ERISA’s weaknesses, one set of 
flawed regulations is far better than the multiple, often equally flawed, 
regimes that would have resulted in its absence. This is all the more true 
given that multi-state benefit plans would have faced regulation from nu-
merous jurisdictions. 
A further criticism of ERISA is the difficulty in interpreting its 
preemption provision.260 Although one of the purposes of ERISA’s 
preemption language261 was to minimize disputes over the degree to which 
state actions conflict with ERISA, litigation over that issue has been signif-
icant.262 Again, taking that criticism as valid, ERISA still appears to pro-
vide a net benefit because such disputes probably impose far fewer costs 
than the myriad of disparate state rules that would exist without ERISA 
preemption. 
Admittedly, it is virtually impossible to quantify these costs and bene-
fits. However, it is hard to believe that the additional litigation required to 
resolve preemption questions is greater than the costs associated with each 
state having its own employee benefit rules.263 Indeed, one could interpret 
ERISA’s experience as a failure to make its preemption strong enough, as 
most questions arise because ERISA permits some state governance.264 
Remove that authority and the preemption issue becomes far less trouble-
some. 
The experience of ERISA serves as both a warning and a hope. De-
spite the many criticisms of ERISA preemption, the important question is 
whether allowing state regulation would create a better governance sys-
tem. It is impossible to predict with certainty, but Congress’s concern 
about a patchwork of state laws was probably well-founded. As an aide to 
Senator Javits, the prime sponsor of ERISA, warned: “if the States are to 
legislate in this field . . . only chaos can result.”265 It is difficult to im-
agine that a multitude of state rules governing various types of pension and 
  
260. See supra note 258. 
261. ERISA § 514. 
262. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 31. 
263. It is possible that an employer could simply comply with the most burdensome state regime, 
but likely differences in reporting and other administrative requirements still creates unavoidable 
conflicts. 
264. ERISA § 514. 
265. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34 (quoting Private Pension Plan Reform: Hearings Be-
fore the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1031 (1973) (statement of Frank Cummings)). Edward 
Zelinsky has argued that ERISA should be amended to allow for more state experimentation with 
health care regulation and that Section 514 should be repealed to “abolish altogether the jurisprudence 
of ERISA preemption.” Zelinsky, New Massachusetts Health Law, supra note 258, at 233; see also 
id. at 276–87. He argues for a repeal of ERISA preemption to “avoid the definitional and borderline 
problems inherent in [the current] more limited exemption from ERISA preemption for state health 
care laws.” Id. at 81. Nationalizing workplace law would obviate Zelinsky’s concerns by broadly 
eliminating state authority over the workplace, thereby avoiding more specific questions about which 
areas still retain governance authority. 
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welfare plans would be a preferable solution to a comprehensive federal 
approach—even one as imperfect as ERISA. 
2. National Labor Relations Act v. the Ratchet Approach 
The other major example of federal workplace preemption is the go-
vernance of private-sector labor law under the NLRA. The Supreme Court 
has long interpreted the NLRA as having a strong preemptive effect—
albeit one that, unlike ERISA, is not explicit.266 
The reasoning for providing the NLRB exclusive authority to enforce 
the NLRA is the agency’s expertise, yet criticism of its performance has 
been extensive.267 The NLRB’s limited remedial authority, significant de-
lays in processing cases, and blatant politicism have all served to under-
mine the NLRB’s credibility and its ability to enforce the NLRA’s goals. 
It is understandable, therefore, that this dissatisfaction has led some to 
look to states as an alternative. However understandable, this argument is 
ill-advised. Although enforcement is a serious problem, particularly after a 
recent series of NLRB decisions favoring employers,268 increased state 
regulation is unlikely to improve enforcement of the NLRA’s goals; in-
deed, it is likely to make matters worse. 
Several commentators have recently argued for increased state authori-
ty of labor relations, most notably Harvard economist Richard Freeman.269 
Professor Freeman asserts that state regulation will generally result in 
more union protections. Yet, it seems more likely that the change would 
hurt unions. To be sure, certain states such as California would move in a 
  
266. Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking 
Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990). The 
Court has recently confirmed the strength of the NLRA’s implied preemption in Chamber of Com-
merce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (holding that NLRA preempts California legislation prohibiting 
employers from using state funds to deter or promote unionization). 
267. See Complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association by the AFL-CIO Concerning 
the United States Government’s Violations of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining by 
Failing to Enforce the National Labor Relations Act 10–41 (ILO Case No. 2608, filed Oct. 25, 2007), 
available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mamr-78btn4/$File/ILOcomplaint.pdf; Cynthia L. 
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530–31 (2002); 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262, 
268–74 (2008).  
268. See, e.g., In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007) (easing restrictions on decertifying 
voluntarily recognized unions); Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The Latest Battle in the War 
on Workers’ Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133607 (describing cases). 
269. Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations Laws?, in Proceed-
ings of the 58th Annual Meeting, Labor & Employment Relations Association Series (2006), available 
at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/irra/proceedings2006/freeman.html; see also Drummonds, 
supra note 228 (arguing for more state control over labor law, in part because shared state and federal 
authority has long been the norm and it allows for more experimentation, flexibility, and voice); 
Secunda, supra note 127 (arguing for more state authority to prohibit workplace captive audience 
meetings). 
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more pro-union direction.270 But many other states would implement more 
pro-employer measures.271 Although Freeman argues that matters cannot 
become much worse in those states, one should not underestimate the im-
agination of pro-employer policymakers. In areas in which the NLRA does 
not apply, such as labor activity involving state employees, a large number 
of states have refused to impose a duty to recognize unions or to protect 
employees’ ability to engage in collective activity without employer retali-
ation. Indeed, many of those states have actively limited employee rights, 
including one of the central federal labor protections—the right to strike.272 
Arguments such as Freeman’s are shortsighted. Although the political 
landscape may look bleak at times for pro-employee advocates, that land-
scape is almost guaranteed to change.273 The inevitable shift of political 
winds should make us reticent to trap ourselves in a policy designed for a 
political environment that will invariably cease to exist. Instead, we should 
focus on which entity is best suited to regulate the workplace over the 
long-run. Concentrating on regulatory competence may sacrifice some 
desired policies in the short-term, but will likely result in a more optimal 
set of workplace laws over time.274 
It is true that if the singular goal was to maximize the promulgation of 
employee rights,275 an alternative “ratchet” or gap-filling approach would 
be best. Under this approach, federal regulation would create a minimum 
floor of rights to which states could add, but not take away.276 This ap-
proach views exclusive federal authority as detrimental because it deprives 
workers of the benefits of laws in more employee-friendly states such as 
California.277 Although California employees would likely gain with in-
creased state regulation, those benefits also involve costs associated with 
increased complexity and inefficient enforcement—costs borne not just by 
California employees, but by employees nationally.278 It is difficult, if not 
  
270. See, e.g., Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408. 
271. Weiler, supra note 38, at 180 (describing “right to work” laws, which allow employees to pay 
no dues to a union that represents them). 
272. Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 313, 313–14 (1993) (noting that most states prohibit public employee strikes). 
273. For example, Freeman released his paper in January 2006, when the NLRB had an active pro-
employer majority. Months later, more union-friendly Democrats gained control of Congress. Then, 
only two years later after Freeman’s paper, the Democrats controlled Congress and the White House. 
274. See supra notes 178–197 and accompanying text. 
275. Although the NLRA places employees’ right to engage in collective action as its main goal, 
protecting business and the national economy are also significant aims. See Textile Workers Union of 
Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965). 
276. See Sperino, supra note 200, at 354–55. 
277. Others have argued more generally that the ratchet approach may provide the best chance to 
reach an optimal mix of rights by allowing the federal government to set a minimum threshold, while 
permitting states to exceed that level if deemed appropriate in that jurisdiction. John O. McGinnis, 
Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 485, 520 (2002).  
278. See supra, Part II.B, III.A.1. 
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impossible, to determine the net result of enhanced state labor regulation; 
however, benefitting employees of a few states at the expense of em-
ployees in other states seems like a poor choice. 
It is ironic that attempts to reform the NLRA could introduce one of 
the few problems that the act has not yet encountered. Federal labor law 
has been mostly immune from the problems implicated by concurrent fed-
eral and state governance over other areas of workplace law. It would be 
ill-advised to introduce such problems to the labor realm via the ratchet 
approach and its additional layer of regulations. Indeed, increased com-
plexity could hinder workers in labor-friendly states from fully enjoying 
the new rights created under the ratchet approach. In contrast to focusing 
on relatively well-off employees, improving enforcement of existing rights 
would better ensure that workers in employer-friendly states actually re-
ceive the protections that society deems important.279 
In short, enhancing protection for workers is an admirable goal, but 
not if such enhancement fails to provide real benefits. The inability of our 
current workplace laws to achieve their stated goals suggests that merely 
adding to existing protections would deliver far less than promised. Ensur-
ing that workplace laws actually accomplish what they say seems a more 
effective path than simply concentrating on the number of laws that exist. 
In addition, resisting a single-minded concern with one party’s inter-
ests is an important facet of regulatory pragmatism. Solely focusing on 
expanding workers’ rights—just like a narrow concern with employer in-
terests—is a poor way to regulate. Even policymakers sympathetic to the 
need of workers must take into account other parties’ concerns. Employer 
interests cannot be ignored, for generating too much employer hostility 
will undermine even the best-laid plans to expand workers’ rights.280 
Instead of expanding state authority in what is likely a failed attempt to 
address the NLRA’s shortcomings, an opportunity exists to improve labor 
law governance as part of a more expansive reformation of workplace law. 
The proposed federal workplace code would address many of the current 
problems with the NLRA’s enforcement. For instance, the NLRA’s anem-
ic remedies would be replaced with the new federal code’s remedial struc-
ture, which would include compensatory and punitive damages, and possi-
bly fines. The only monetary award currently available to the NLRB is 
backpay—fines, compensatory damages, and punitive damages are not 
permissible.281 Allowing these traditional damage awards, as well as fines 
in cases where such damages are inappropriate,282 would eliminate em-
  
279. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152–57 (1971) (describing “maximin” theory that social 
welfare is best served by a policy that maximizes the worst, rather than the average, outcome); see 
also Weil, supra note 23, at 127. 
280. Hirsch, supra note 99, at 139–42 (discussing Title VII backlash). 
281. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000); Estlund, supra note 267, at 1552. 
282. An employer’s failure to bargain with a union is an example of a serious unfair labor practice 
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ployers’ ability in many cases to violate the NLRA without facing any 
monetary penalty other than their own litigation costs.283 
The workplace code’s improved adjudicatory system would also en-
hance enforcement of labor rights.284 Increased damages that would attract 
more attorneys, as well as a new forum for workplace claims, would pro-
vide employees more opportunities and incentives to challenge unlawful 
employer practices. 
Further, adjudicating labor cases under a specialized workplace court 
system would eliminate the wasted resources and inconsistent results that 
can occur when disputes involve issues that fall both inside and outside of 
the NLRB’s jurisdiction. For example, under current law, allegations that 
an employer terminated employees because of their union activity and race 
could not be adjudicated in a single proceeding. The NLRB has exclusive 
authority to determine the union animus claim, but could not address the 
racial discrimination claim.285 In contrast, a unified workplace court could 
address all of these claims in a single proceeding. 
The NLRB’s exclusive enforcement of the NLRA has been far from 
perfect. Yet, permitting state governance is no solution. To the contrary, a 
better option would be to strengthen federal control over labor and other 
workplace regulations. Although some employees would benefit from in-
creased state authority over labor law, far more employees would enjoy 
the improved enforcement that would result from the new federal 
workplace code’s reforms. 
In the end, however, anecdotes about past legislative experiences have 
limited persuasiveness either for or against workplace federalism. The 
problem with such anecdotes is that they extrapolate the experiences of a 
federalist regulatory model to a proposed national model. In other words, 
the experiences under today’s system of concurrent federal and state go-
vernance have limited relevance to what would happen if states no longer 
had a role in workplace governance; those experiences cannot predict what 
a federal government with exclusive control would have done. A better 
comparison is to other nationalized workplace regimes—a comparison that 
  
in which damages are unavailable. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970). Similarly, even cur-
rent monetary damages in termination cases—which consist solely of backpay—may be small if the 
employee if able to find similar-paying work quickly. NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 
1307, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing interim earnings deduction). 
283. Estlund, supra note 42, at 390 (describing importance of private workplace litigation in re-
forming public enforcement). The workplace code’s termination rule would make a reinstatement 
order more viable. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; Hirsch, supra note 99, at 145 (explain-
ing that unjust dismissal protection counters the fact that most employees do not stay long after return-
ing pursuant to a reinstatement order). 
284. See supra notes 240–242 and accompanying text. 
285. Similarly, a termination may raise possible violations of both the NLRA and a collective-
bargaining agreement. The NLRB has sole authority to find NLRA violations, while federal courts 
have sole jurisdiction over claims alleging breaches of collective-bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185(a) (2000); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). 
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suggests that a nationalized system would not be ruinous and would in-
stead likely produce a more efficient and effective system of workplace 
rules.286 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our current workplace regulatory scheme is broken. It consists of an 
unnecessarily confusing and ineffective patchwork of laws that often 
leaves workers with little more than empty promises. A problem of this 
significance warrants an equally significant solution—the nationalization of 
workplace law. 
Much of the problem with today’s workplace laws is that they have 
developed virtually independent of each other. With few exceptions, these 
laws were implemented by federal or state governments at various points 
in time as a response to an immediate policy concern. That regulatory 
approach can be appropriate, but it raises the possibility—one that has 
repeatedly been realized in the workplace context—that policymakers will 
fail to consider each new law’s interaction with the existing framework. 
The aggregate effect is a broad system of laws that ultimately collapses 
under the weight of its own complexity. 
This complexity inhibits parties’ understanding of workplace rules, as 
well as attempts to enforce them. For instance, voluntary compliance is a 
central goal of most workplace laws, yet even good faith employers face 
significant costs in trying to understand and follow all of the relevant re-
quirements. Employers’ difficulties in understanding the multitude of 
complicated workplace rules is dwarfed by the problems encountered by 
employees, who have far less time, resources, and knowledge than their 
employers. This information problem cripples employees’ ability both to 
understand what rights they possess and to seek enforcement even when 
they are aware of unlawful activity. Enforcement of workplace protections 
is no better, as a single set of facts can produce multiple claims, under 
multiple jurisdictions, and in multiple forums. Given these problems, it is 
no surprise that most workplace laws have been a disappointment. 
This complex and inefficient system of workplace laws is suboptimal, 
as there are many reforms that could produce far more benefits than costs. 
Because the shortcomings of this system are so severe, what is needed 
most is a radically new approach to workplace regulation. Policymakers 
should use a more pragmatic method that would consider how all of the 
various workplace laws fit together and what is needed to make their en-
forcement more effective. The proposed nationalization of workplace law 
would be a broad culmination of such an approach. 
  
286. See supra note 6. 
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The nationalized federal workplace code would achieve more effective 
compliance and enforcement through a dramatic simplification of existing 
rules. It would vertically integrate those rules by completely replacing 
state authority over the workplace with exclusive federal control. The code 
would also horizontally integrate workplace rules by consolidating re-
quirements where possible, simplifying rules that must stand on their own, 
and implementing a unified enforcement and administrative scheme. The 
result would be a new workplace regulatory system that is far easier to 
understand, to follow, and to enforce than existing law. 
Nationalization is no panacea, of course, as it could end up imposing 
more costs than benefits. However, even if policymakers are too wary to 
enact this ambitious reform, any attempt to engage in more pragmatic de-
cision making would move workplace regulation closer to its optimal lev-
el. Seemingly small improvements, such as consolidating certain federal 
and state claims, reducing disparate enforcement requirements, and mak-
ing more consistent definitions across various laws would produce substan-
tial gains. In contrast, policymakers’ continued refusal to recognize that 
the goals of today’s workplace laws are collapsing under their own weight 
threatens to accelerate that disturbing trend. It is only by comprehensively 
and pragmatically addressing these problems that our system of workplace 
laws will deliver on its many promises. 
